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IS TOO BIG TO FAIL TOO BIG TO 
CONFESS?: SCRUTINIZING THE SEC’s “NO-
ADMIT” CONSENT JUDGMENT PROPOSALS 
Abstract: When the Securities and Exchange Commission initiates court 
action against a public company for violation of federal securities laws, it 
often proposes a court-enforced settlement between the parties known as 
a “consent judgment.” Nearly all SEC consent judgment proposals con-
tain a “no-admit” clause, whereby the defendant explicitly refuses to con-
fess to the allegations asserted in the SEC’s complaint. Although “no-
admit” consent judgments avoid the costs and uncertainties associated 
with prolonged litigation, they might not be effective in deterring future 
misconduct, and they could conceal the full truth about the defendant’s 
wrongdoing. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, courts have increas-
ingly questioned whether the SEC’s “no-admit” consent judgment pro-
posals adequately promote the public interest. Despite the courts’ con-
cerns, however, the SEC—and not the courts—is in the best position to 
assess whether its consent judgment proposals promote the public inter-
est and to implement suitable changes. Accordingly, to ensure that con-
sent judgment proposals do in fact promote the public interest, the SEC 
should reevaluate its current settlement practices and make appropriate 
adjustments. 
Introduction 
 During childhood, many disputes end by way of forced apology.1 
But in the securities world, malfeasants rarely acknowledge responsibil-
ity for their actions.2 In fact, under the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion’s (SEC) standard settlement terms, malefactors may expressly re-
fuse to confess to wrongdoing.3 Since November 2011, in SEC v. 
Citigroup Global Markets Inc. (Citigroup I ), when Judge Jed S. Rakoff of 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
struck down a $285 million settlement between the SEC and a subsidi-
ary of Citigroup Inc. because the company explicitly refused to admit 
                                                                                                                      
1 Cathy Cassani Adams, The Forced Apology—A Path to Peace?, Chi. Parent (Oct. 20, 
2011), http://www.chicagoparent.com/community/the-self-aware-parent/2011/october/ 
the-forced-apology—a-path-to-peace. 
2 Danné L. Johnson, SEC Settlement: Agency Self-Interest or Public Interest, 12 Fordham J. 
Corp. & Fin. L. 627, 647 (2007). 
3 Id. 
1727 
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to misconduct, the SEC has come under increasingly intense pressure 
to force defendants to own up like grown-ups.4 
 The recent controversy originates in the SEC’s endemic use of “no-
admit” consent judgment proposals.5 A “no-admit” consent judgment 
enforces a settlement containing a “no-admit” clause, under which the 
defendant explicitly disclaims any admissions of wrongdoing.6 Defen-
dants value “no-admit” clauses because they help to eliminate collateral 
estoppel effects and mitigate potential economic and reputational re-
percussions.7 The SEC, in turn, willingly employs “no-admit” clauses to 
extract other concessions and to avoid the costs and uncertainty of tri-
al.8 
 Critics, however, assert that “no-admit” consent judgments do not 
adequately promote the public interest because the judgments do not 
deter future misbehavior or aid the public in learning the truth about a 
defendant’s prior misbehavior.9 Moreover, “no-admit” consent judg-
ments diminish a defendant’s anticipated adverse consequences and 
thereby encourage unlawful conduct.10 Additionally, such “no-admit” 
                                                                                                                      
4 See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc. (Citigroup I ), 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332, 335 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); Joe Palazzolo, Law Professors Jump in Rakoff’s Corner, Wall St. J.L. Blog 
(Aug. 17, 2012, 9:54 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/08/17/law-professors-jump-in-
rakoffs-corner/. 
5 See Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 328, 332, 335; Palazzolo, supra note 4 (indicating 
that many law professors oppose the SEC’s “prevalent practice” of settling enforcement 
action by consent judgments). 
6 Johnson, supra note 2, at 647. The SEC allows defendants to settle on a “no-admit” 
basis by including a clause that states that the defendant “neither admits nor denies” the 
allegations in the SEC’s complaint. See Kevin LaCroix, A Closer Look at Judge Rakoff’s Rejec-
tion of the SEC’s Settlement with Citigroup, D & O Diary (Nov. 29, 2011), http://dandodiary. 
com/2011/11/articles/securities-litigation/a-closer-look-at-judge-rakoffs-rejection-of-the-
secs-settlement-with-citigroup/. 
7 Examining the Settlement Practices of U.S. Financial Regulators: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 6 (2012) [hereinafter Settlement Practices] (statement of Robert 
Khuzami, Director of the Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission); 
Comm. on Fed. Reg., Am. Bar Ass’n, Report of the Task Force on SEC Settlements, 47 Bus. Law. 
1083, 1093 (1992) [hereinafter ABA Report]. 
8 Settlement Practices, supra note 7, at 3, 6–7 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director of 
the Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission). 
9 See Michael C. Macchiarola, “Hallowed by History, but Not by Reason”: Judge Rakoff’s Critique 
of the Security and Exchange Commission’s Consent Judgment Practice, 16 CUNY L. Rev. 51, 53 
(2012) (suggesting that courts should curb the SEC’s “affinity for settlement”); Edward Wy-
att, Responding to Critics, S.E.C. Defends “No Wrongdoing” Settlements, N.Y. Times Dealbook, Feb. 
22, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/s-e-c-chairwoman-defends-settle 
ment-practices/ [hereinafter Responding to Critics] (noting that critics have raised concerns 
about the SEC’s settlement practices over the past decade); Palazzolo, supra note 4 (describ-
ing a brief submitted by law professors that criticized the SEC’s habit of “settling enforcement 
actions alleging serious fraud without any acknowledgement of the facts”). 
10 See Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332; Palazzolo, supra note 4. 
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consent judgments fail to provide the public with clear, definitive in-
formation about the defendant’s misconduct.11 
 Accordingly, some courts have followed Judge Rakoff’s lead in the 
Citigroup I litigation and have closely examined recent SEC consent 
judgment proposals.12 As a result, ample attention has recently focused 
on the court’s role in approving or rejecting “no-admit” SEC consent 
judgment proposals.13 Attitudes tend to diverge according to the way 
consent judgments are understood generally.14 Models of consent 
judgments range from those that treat the parties’ agreement with sub-
stantial deference to those that demand exacting scrutiny.15 
 The SEC, however, is in a much better position than a court to 
identify and implement appropriate consent judgment terms.16 Courts 
are far more limited than the SEC in determining whether a particular 
SEC consent judgment proposal adequately balances the competing 
considerations that factor into an SEC litigation decision, and courts 
cannot craft consent judgments on their own.17 Unlike a court, which 
can reach decisions only upon the evidence presented before it, the 
SEC enjoys a broad perspective—including an awareness of budgetary 
constraints and historical litigation success—that allows it to effectively 
                                                                                                                      
11 See Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332; Palazzolo, supra note 4. 
12 See FTC v. Circa Direct LLC (Circa Direct III ), No. 11-2172, 2012 WL 3987610, at *1 
(D.N.J. Feb. 22, 2012); Letter from the Court to Plaintiff’s counsel at 1, SEC v. Koss Corp., 
No. 2:11-cv-00991-RTR (E.D. Wis. Dec. 20, 2011), [hereinafter Letter from Judge Randa]. 
13 See Macchiarola, supra note 9, at 53; Responding to Critics, supra note 9; Palazzolo, 
supra note 4. 
14 See Thomas M. Mengler, Consent Decree Paradigms: Models Without Meaning, 29 B.C. L. 
Rev. 291, 292 (1988) (discussing the different principles embodied by the contract, judi-
cial act, hybrid, and functional models of consent judgment proposals, each of which sup-
ports a different level of judicial scrutiny). 
15 Id. at 295, 313–14. 
16 See SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp. (BofA II ), Nos. 09 Civ. 6829, 10 Civ. 0215, 2010 WL 
624581, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010) (referring to a settlement between the SEC and 
Bank of America as “half-baked justice at best,” but nevertheless approving the parties’ 
consent judgment proposal because the SEC is the regulatory body primarily responsible 
for overseeing the securities markets); U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Div. of Enforcement, 
Enforcement Manual § 2.5.1 (2012) [hereinafter SEC Enforcement Manual], available 
at www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf (indicating that the SEC—not 
a court—formulates the consent judgments that arrive before the bench). 
17 See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc. (Citigroup II ), 673 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) 
(citations omitted)) (declaring that the federal courts should not choose between compet-
ing views of the public interest in deciding whether to approve an SEC consent judgment 
proposal); SEC Enforcement Manual, supra note 16, § 2.5.1 (indicating that the SEC has 
sole authority to settle its enforcement actions). 
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weigh the benefits and drawbacks of its litigation options.18 Moreover, 
courts can only consider the consent judgment proposals that the SEC 
places before it.19 Accordingly, the SEC is the party in the best position 
to evaluate and adjust its settlements.20 
 Recognizing the courts’ concerns regarding “no-admit” clauses, 
however, the SEC should take steps to ensure that their use is limited to 
circumstances in which they serve the public interest.21 First, the SEC 
should limit the use of such proposals by requiring outright admissions 
in large, novel, and high-profile cases or, alternatively, by simply refus-
ing to settle on a “no-admit” basis.22 Second, when certain elements of 
a case prove more important than others, the SEC should limit the 
scope of “no-admit” clauses to narrower sets of allegations and nar-
rower sets of collateral estoppel effects.23 Third, the SEC should pro-
vide a court with an extremely thorough explanation for any consent 
judgment for which it seeks approval.24 Collectively, these measures 
                                                                                                                      
18 See Settlement Practices, supra note 7, at 2 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director of the 
Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission) (elucidating the process by 
which the SEC makes enforcement-action decisions). 
19 See SEC Enforcement Manual, supra note 16, § 2.5.1. 
20 See BofA II, 2010 WL 624581, at *5–6 (approving an SEC consent judgment proposal 
despite the court’s belief that the proposal represented “half-baked justice at best” because 
the SEC shoulders the “primary responsibility for policing the securities market”); SEC 
Enforcement Manual, supra note 16, § 2.5.1 (indicating that the SEC—rather than the 
courts—crafts every consent judgment proposal). 
21 See Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332 (suggesting that the SEC should provide more 
thorough justifications for its proposed consent judgments); ABA Report, supra note 7, at 
1169 (contending that the SEC should limit the breadth of its “neither admit nor deny” 
clauses); Fleming James, Jr., Consent Judgments as Collateral Estoppel, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 173, 
193 (1959) (arguing that in order to obtain the collateral estoppel effects they desire par-
ties should convey how they intend to be bound by a consent judgment); Johnson, supra 
note 2, at 679 (recommending that courts require the SEC to litigate novel cases). 
22 See Johnson, supra note 2, at 679. See generally Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (criticiz-
ing the SEC’s “no-admit” consent judgment proposals). Requiring admissions differs from 
refusing to settle on a “no-admit” basis because the latter does not include explicit admis-
sions; it simply creates ambiguity as to whether the consent judgment constitutes an admis-
sion or not. See William O. Reckler & Blake T. Denton, Understanding Recent Changes to the 
SEC’s “Neither Admit Nor Deny” Settlement Policy, Corp. Governance Advisor (Aspen Pub-
lishers, New York, N.Y.), Mar.–Apr. 2012, at 1–2. 
23 See ABA Report, supra note 7, at 1169 (arguing that the SEC should temper its “nei-
ther admit nor deny” policy by allowing mitigating or exculpatory language in its consent 
judgment proposals, which would further the SEC’s interests and encourage settlement); 
James, supra note 21, at 176–77, 193 (describing collateral estoppel as “the effect of a for-
mer judgment in a later action based upon a different claim or demand” and asserting 
that a court should effectuate the parties’ desired collateral estoppel effects). 
24 See Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332 (holding that the SEC failed to provide suffi-
cient information upon which the court could make an informed judgment regarding a 
consent judgment proposal). 
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would ensure that the SEC retains sufficient leverage to stave off poten-
tial securities violations and would provide the public with clearer and 
more conclusive information about violations that have already taken 
p e.lac
 scope in others, 
and fully explain their use or disuse in all cases.29 
I. The Controver -Admit” Consent 
admit” clause.32 The SEC’s “no-admit” consent judgment proposals, 
     
25 
 Accordingly, this Note argues, from an executive-centric perspec-
tive, that the SEC should alter its current “no-admit” consent judgment 
policies and procedures.26 Part I describes the SEC’s “no-admit” con-
sent judgment proposals and the controversy they have engendered.27 
Part II explains the major judiciary-centric views of consent judgments 
and details the executive-centric perspective.28 Finally, Part III justifies 
an executive-centric assessment of SEC “no-admit” consent judgment 
proposals and, from that perspective, contends that the SEC should 
exclude “no-admit” clauses in some cases, narrow their
sy over the SEC’s “No
Judgment Proposals 
 Activities in the national securities market fall within the jurisdic-
tion of the SEC.30 When the SEC detects a possible violation of federal 
securities laws, it may initiate an enforcement proceeding against the 
alleged perpetrator in either an administrative or judicial forum.31 
When choosing the latter, the SEC often proposes a court-enforced set-
tlement known as a “consent judgment,” which often contains a “no-
                                                                                                                 
25 See id. at 333 (“The S.E.C., by contrast, took the position that, because Citigroup did 
not expressly deny the allegations, the Court, and the public, somehow knew the truth of the 
allegations. This is a wrong as a matter of law and unpersuasive as a matter of fact.”); Ryan 
Grim, Elizabeth Warren Embarrasses Hapless Bank Regulators at First Hearing (Video), Huffington 
Post, Feb. 14, 2013, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/14/elizabeth-
warren-bank-regulators_n_2688998.html (describing Senator Elizabeth Warren’s concern 
that the SEC loses leverage over defendants when the agency fails to hold them accountable 
for t
 
ohn C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Regulation 55 (12th ed. 
200
 
heir financial misconduct). 
26 See infra notes 215–297 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 30–125 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 126–214 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 215–297 and accompanying text. 
30 J
6). 
31 Johnson, supra note 2, at 644–45. 
32 Id. at 647; Mengler, supra note 14, at 292; see, e.g., Proposed Final Consent Judgment 
as to Defendants Quadrangle Group LLC and Quadrangle GP Investors II, L.P., SEC v. 
Quadrangle Group, LLC, 10-cv-1392 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2010), available at http://www. 
sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21487-consent.pdf (proposing a consent judgment 
containing a “no-admit” clause stating that “the Defendants having executed the Consent 
1732 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1727 
however, have received heavy criticism in the aftermath of the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis.33 
 Section A of this Part describes SEC consent judgments and the 
criteria by which courts evaluate them.34 Section B details “no-admit” 
clauses.35 Finally, Section C identifies recent judicial decisions that have 
expressed concerns about “no-admit” consent judgment proposals, and 
highlights the subsequent SEC and congressional developments regard-
ing their use.36 
A. SEC Consent Judgments 
 The SEC is responsible for regulating the national securities mar-
ket.37 The SEC monitors public companies and may initiate an en-
forcement proceeding if it suspects a violation of federal securities 
laws.38 Before formally commencing a proceeding, the SEC conducts 
an investigation.39 If the investigation yields information that provides 
grounds for a proceeding, SEC staff issue a “Wells notice” to the poten-
tial defendant to apprise her of the charges the staff may recom-
mend.40 The potential defendant may respond with a “Wells submis-
sion.”41 The SEC and the potential defendant commonly engage in 
                                                                                                                      
annexed hereto and incorporated herein . . . and, without admitting or denying the allega-
tions contained in the Complaint,” agree to prescribed penalties); Final Judgment as to 
Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co., SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 03 Civ. 2944 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 31, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/judg18113.pdf (enter-
ing a consent judgment containing a “no-admit” clause stating that the defendant “con-
sented to entry . . . without admitting or denying the allegations of the Complaint”). 
33 See Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 335; Palazzolo, supra note 4. 
34 See infra notes 37–73 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 74–86 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 87–125 and accompanying text. 
37 Coffee & Sale, supra note 30, at 55. 
38 Melanie Gray et al., Striking the Right Balance: Public Versus Private Enforcement Laws—
What Will We Learn from This Financial Meltdown?, 60 Syracuse L. Rev. 449, 449 (2010). 
39 Raymond L. Britton & N. Kimberly Bohannon, “Perp” Walk or Cake Walk? A Study of 
the S.E.C.’s Enforcement of the Securities Laws Through Agreed Settlements, 5 Hous. Bus. & Tax L. 
J. 241, 254–55 (2005). 
40 See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c) (2012) (authorizing SEC staff to advise potential defendants 
of the nature of an investigation and the amount of time they may have to communicate 
with the SEC before the agency commences a legal proceeding); SEC Enforcement Man-
ual, supra note 16, § 2.4. A “Wells notice” informs a defendant that an investigation has 
taken place and that legal action by the SEC will likely ensue. Mark Koba, Wells Notice—
CNBC Explains, CNBC (Nov. 28, 2012, 9:34 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/45612974. 
41 SEC Enforcement Manual, supra note 16, § 2.4. In a “Wells submission,” the de-
fendant typically argues that the SEC should not prosecute the case against it. Koba, supra 
note 40. 
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negotiations during the Wells process.42 If the defendant cannot per-
suade the SEC to forego legal action, the SEC will then initiate a pro-
ceeding, which may or may not lead to a consensual settlement pro-
osa
to initiate an entirely new proceeding to compel 
e d
p l.43 
 The proceeding can take place either in court or within the agency 
itself.44 When the SEC brings an administrative enforcement proceed-
ing, it may seek to levy fines on certain professionals, issue cease and 
desist orders, or suspend trading.45 Although a subsequent violation of 
an SEC cease and desist order is itself actionable in court, the SEC is 
forced to initiate an entirely new proceeding in court to seek this re-
dress.46 When the SEC files an enforcement action in court, it can pur-
sue a variety of judicial remedies, including injunctions, civil penalties, 
employment restrictions, and disgorgement of profits.47 A subsequent 
violation of a court order amounts to contempt of court, meaning that 
the SEC does not need 
th efendant to act.48 
 An SEC enforcement action filed in court usually results in a court-
enforced settlement known as a “consent judgment.”49 Under such a 
settlement, the defendant agrees to certain concessions, the SEC agrees 
not to pursue trial, and the court agrees to exercise continuing jurisdic-
                                                                                                                      
42 See 17 C.F.R. § 201.240(a) (2012) (“Any person who is notified that a proceeding 
may or will be instituted against him or her, or any party to a proceeding already instituted, 
may
ement Manual, supra note 16, § 2.5.1; Arthur B. Laby & W. Hardy Call-
cott  1990 Remedies Act: Civil Money Penalties, 58 Alb. L. 
Rev
te 2, at 644–45. 
. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, Securities Law Handbook §§ 36:31, 
36:3
nt decrees nearly iden-
tica
, at any time, propose in writing an offer of settlement.”); SEC Enforcement Manual, 
supra note 16, § 2.4. 
43 SEC Enforc
, Patterns of SEC Enforcement Under the
. 5, 21 (1994). 
44 Johnson, supra no
45 2 Harold S
5, 36:42 (2011 ed.). 
46 Id. § 36:37. 
47 Id. §§ 36:12, 36:16, 36:20, 36:23. 
48 Mengler, supra note 14, at 292. 
49 Johnson, supra note 2, at 647. Sometimes, the SEC files its consent judgment pro-
posal at the same time it files its complaint. Laby & Callcott, supra note 43, at 21. Consent 
judgments are also known as “consent orders” or “consent decrees” although, historically, 
consent decrees and consent orders have contained injunctive relief and consent judg-
ments have not. See Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 331 (treating consent judgments and 
consent decrees in precisely the same manner); Black’s Law Dictionary 471, 918 (9th 
ed. 2009) (defining consent judgments, consent orders, and conse
lly); see also Mengler, supra note 14, at 291 n.1 (describing the historical distinctions 
among consent judgments, consent decrees, and consent orders). 
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ti over the case so that a violation of the consent judgment consti-
tutes contempt of court.
on 
uing litigation can slow the compensation process.54 Finally, a 
ns
And, if the defendant agrees to settle before an enforcement action is 
even filed, the defendant can elude the negative publicity that attends 
                                                                                                                     
50 
 The parties in an SEC enforcement action agree to consent judg-
ment proposals for a number of reasons.51 The SEC can tout a consent 
judgment as a political victory by exacting at least some form of pen-
alty.52 Moreover, the agency can also avoid the time, expense, and op-
portunity costs of continuing litigation.53 Importantly, the delay caused 
by contin
co ent judgment eliminates the risk of a less-favorable litigation out-
come.55 
 From the defendant’s perspective, a consent judgment can be fa-
vorable because the defendant can obtain a relatively lenient penalty by 
forfeiting its challenge to the enforcement action.56 Like the SEC, the 
defendant can also avoid the costs associated with further litigation.57 
 
50 See United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971) (observing that a con-
ercises continuing jurisdiction over a case 
and
es 
und egative publicity that would attend a trial.”). 
 other allegations of securities impropriety); Britton & Bohannon, 
supr
huzami, Director of the 
Div
an the coercive nature of a non-
con
sent decree naturally embodies a compromise); Mengler, supra note 14, at 292 (indicating 
that a court that enters a consent judgment ex
 may hold a violator in contempt of court). 
51 E.g., SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp. (BofA I ), 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (ob-
serving that, by requesting a consent judgment in a high-profile case, the SEC gets to claim 
that it exposed wrongdoing); Britton & Bohannon, supra note 39, at 256 (“Litigation is costly 
and time-consuming for both sides. In order to process its ever-increasing caseload, the 
Commission must rely heavily upon a high settlement rate. In [a] similar vein, compani
er investigation wish to avoid the n
52 BofA I, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 512. 
53 Settlement Practices, supra note 7, at 7 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director of the 
Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission) (arguing that the SEC 
incurs opportunity costs when it devotes resources to litigating a case when, alternatively, it 
could be investigating
a note 39, at 256. 
54 Settlement Practices, supra note 7, at 7 (statement of Robert K
ision of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission). 
55 Id. at 3 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director of the Division of Enforcement, Se-
curities and Exchange Commission). Additionally, the voluntary nature of a consent 
judgment may more effectively encourage compliance th
sensual judgment. See Mengler, supra note 14, at 314. 
56 Armour, 402 U.S. at 681 (acknowledging that each party gives up something that it 
might have won through further litigation); Howard Sklar, I Cannot Tell a Lie: I Neither Admit 
Nor Deny I Chopped Down the Cherry Tree, Forbes ( Jan. 4, 2012, 12:55 PM), http://www. 
forbes.com/sites/howardsklar/2012/01/04/i-cannot-tell-a-lie-i-neither-admit-nor-deny-i-
chopped-down-the-cherry-tree/ (“The ‘neither admit nor deny’ is a huge boon for the party 
settling the action. Rakoff wrote—and I agree—that settling this way has become the cost of 
doing business for regulated companies, and the market understands that no company wants 
to g
57 Britton & Bohannon, supra note 39, at 256. 
o twelve rounds with their regulator.”). 
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litigation.58 In the business context, these benefits are especially attrac-
tive because the prospect of trial may devalue company stock.59 
 A court must approve a proposed consent judgment before it be-
comes effective.60 Courts have discretion to affirm or reject proposed 
consent judgments, subject to certain limits.61 In exercising their dis-
cretion, courts must evaluate the fairness, reasonableness, and ade-
quacy of a proposed consent judgment.62 When a proposed consent 
judgment includes a permanent injunction, a court may also consider 
the public interest.63 
                                                                                                                     
 To assess compliance with these standards, a court might analyze a 
variety of factors, including the strength of the case, the risks of pro-
 
58 Id. 
59 See, e.g., Morgan Stanley Shares Slide on Reports of SEC Investigation, Telegraph, May 13, 
2010, [hereinafter Morgan Stanley Shares Slide] available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/fi- 
nance/ newsbysector/banksandfinance/7717687/Morgan-Stanley-shares-slide-on-reports-of-
SEC-investigation.html (reporting that shares of Morgan Stanley dropped over two percent 
after the Wall Street Journal revealed that the SEC was investigating possible misconduct by the 
firm); Carolyn O’Hara, SEC Charges Goldman Sachs with Fraud, PBS Newshour, Apr. 16, 2010, 
www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2010/04/sec-charges-goldman-sachs-with-fraud.html 
[hereinafter SEC Charges Goldman Sachs] (indicating that Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. stock 
values dropped ten percent within an hour after the SEC charged the firm with fraud). 
60 See Mengler, supra note 14, at 291–92. 
61 SEC v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1984) (“‘The initial decision to ap-
prove or reject a settlement proposal is committed to the sound discretion of the trial 
judge.’ This discretion is not unbridled, however.” (quoting Officers for Justice v. Civil 
Serv. Comm’n, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982))). Judicial discretion in accepting or re-
jecting consent judgment proposals helps to “tame, and thereby legitimate” agency power. 
Bryan Clark & Amanda C. Leiter, Regulatory Hide and Seek: What Agencies Can (and Can’t) Do 
to Limit Judicial Review, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1687, 1687 (2011) (quoting M. Elizabeth Magill, 
Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1383, 1413 (2004)). 
62 Randolph, 736 F.2d at 528. Fairness, reasonableness, adequacy, and the public inter-
est may be related. Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 331–32 (recognizing that the consent 
judgment approval factors inform each other). For instance, a consent judgment may 
need to be fair to the public as well as to the parties in the case. See United States v. Truck-
ing Emp’rs, Inc., 561 F.2d 313, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (treating both fairness to the public 
and fairness to the parties as parts of the fairness inquiry). Similarly, a consent judgment 
may need to be adequate to protect the public interest. See Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 
331–32 (“[T]he settlement must be adequate to ensure that the public interest is pro-
tected.”). Additionally, courts analyze consent judgments in light of the governing statute’s 
goals. Sys. Fed’n No. 91, Ry. Emp. Dept. v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 651 (1961) (emphasizing 
the importance of honoring statutory objectives when deciding whether to enter or modify 
a consent judgment). 
63 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (requiring a plaintiff 
seeking a permanent injunction to prove that the injunction would not disserve the public 
interest). In at least one other area of law, the court must always consider the public interest. 
Antitrust Procedures & Penalties (Tunney) Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (2006). Section 5 of the 
Tunney Act compels a court to consider the public interest when determining whether to 
enter a consent judgment that would settle an antitrust case brought under its provisions. Id. 
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longed litigation, the agreed-upon penalty, the extent of completed 
discovery, the stage of the proceedings, and the experience and views 
of counsel and the parties.64 A court may reject a proposed consent 
judgment in certain special circumstances.65 For example, a court will 
likely reject a proposed consent judgment when it would violate the law 
or the rights of third parties.66 Additionally, a court may also reject a 
proposed consent judgment when, by calling on the court to referee a 
complex ongoing relationship between the parties for an indefinite 
period of time, the consent judgment would demand excessive judicial 
resources.67 A court could also require further explanation from the 
parties when it cannot specifically determine its own obligations under 
the proposal.68 
 Nonetheless, the law generally favors settlement.69 Moreover, 
agreements between sophisticated parties and executive agencies gen-
                                                                                                                      
64 See Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 625. A court’s inquiry into a consent judgment is, 
naturally, made on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., United States v. Cannons Eng’g Corp., 899 
F.2d 79, 85–86 (1st Cir. 1990) (interpreting the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act to require district courts to “treat each case on its own 
merits, recognizing the wide range of potential problems and possible solutions” (citing 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601–9675 (1987))); Randolph, 736 F.2d at 529–30 (weighing the case’s strength against 
approval of a settlement, but weighing litigation expense, one defendant’s cooperation, 
and the settlement’s terms themselves in favor of approval). The court will abuse its discre-
tion in evaluating consent judgments when the court ignores an important factor, relies on 
an unimportant factor, or weighs factors inappropriately. Indep. Oil & Chem. Workers of 
Quincy, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 927, 929 (1st Cir. 1988). 
65 See, e.g., Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 609 (1984) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); St. Charles Tower, Inc. v. Kurtz, 643 F.3d 264, 268 (8th Cir. 
2011); In re United States, 503 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. City of Hiale-
ah, 140 F.3d 968, 983–84 (11th Cir. 1998). 
66 See Kurtz, 643 F.3d at 268 (remanding because the district court’s consent judgment 
would violate local zoning laws); City of Hialeah, 140 F.3d at 984 (permitting a district court 
to reject a consent judgment that would impair the rights of non-consenting employees 
under prior collective bargaining agreements). 
67 See Stotts, 467 U.S. at 609 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (remarking that the implemen-
tation of a consent judgment often takes years); In re United States, 503 F.3d at 641 (noting 
that “a judge may reject a proposed consent decree in civil litigation if implementing the 
decree would create a drain on judicial resources”). 
68 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1461–62 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (permitting 
the district court’s inquiry into replacement product lines covered by a consent judgment 
proposal because “the district judge who must preside over the implementation of the decree 
is certainly entitled to insist on that degree of precision concerning the resolution of known 
issues as to make his task, in resolving subsequent disputes, reasonably manageable”). 
69 Cannons, 899 F.2d at 84 (noting that “it is the policy of the law to encourage settle-
ments”). 
2013] SEC “No-Admit” Consent Judgment Proposals 1737 
erally receive judicial deference.70 Sophisticated parties are typically 
able to adequately defend their interests.71 And agencies, in carrying 
out their missions, presumably promote the public interest.72 Further-
more, because the Constitution grants the executive branch policy-
making authority, courts must avoid dictating policy to executive ad-
ministrative agencies.73 
B. “No-Admit” Clauses in SEC Consent Judgment Proposals 
 Most SEC consent judgment proposals contain a “neither admit 
nor deny” clause pursuant to which the defendant neither admits nor 
denies any of the allegations contained in the SEC’s complaint.74 The 
“no-deny” aspect of the SEC’s “neither admit nor deny” consent judg-
ment proposals has been relatively uncontroversial, but the “no-admit” 
aspect has proven highly contentious.75 Unlike “no-deny” clauses, which 
leave open the possibility that misconduct did actually occur, “no-admit” 
clauses leave open the possibility that misconduct did not actually oc-
cur.76 Thus, just as the SEC seeks “no-deny” clauses, defendants seek 
                                                                                                                      
70 Id. (“Respect for the agency’s role is heightened in a situation where the cards have 
been dealt face up and a crew of sophisticated players, with sharply conflicting interests, sit 
at th
aining that the policy of encouraging settlements “has particular force 
whe government actor committed to the protection of the public interest has 
pull
judges—who have no 
con
su-
pra 
ongdoing are not only willing, but also eager to settle); Eric Rieder et al., 
Shift
lause that would conceal the truth about the 
 
e table.”). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. (expl
re . . . a 
ed the laboring oar in constructing the proposed settlement”). 
73 Citigroup II, 673 F.3d at 163 (“It is not, however, the proper function of federal courts 
to dictate policy to executive administrative agencies. ‘[F]ederal 
stituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.’” 
(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866)). A court usually will not reject an agency’s proposed 
consent judgment unless the agency acts with bad faith or malfeasance. Sam Fox Publ’g 
Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 689 (1961) (refusing to question a consent judgment 
proposed by the government in the absence of a claim of bad faith or malfeasance). Bad 
faith or malfeasance can arise when “consent” is involuntary or the proposed consent 
judgment fails to advance the objectives of the governing statute. M. Todd Henderson, 
Impact of the Rakoff Ruling: Was the Judge’s Scuttling of the SEC/BofA Settlement Legally Pointless 
or Incredibly Important—or Both?, Wall St. Law., Nov. 2009, at 5. 
74 ABA Report, supra note 7, at 1169 (noting that an SEC “neither admit nor deny” 
clause applies to each and every allegation the SEC asserts in its complaint); Johnson, 
note 2, at 647. 
75 See Britton & Bohannon, supra note 39, at 307 (asserting that defendants who do not 
have to admit to wr
ing Tides for SEC Settlements: A Sea Change in the Making?, Bus. Law Today, Mar. 2012, at 1, 
available at http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/content/2012/03/article-01-rieder-
burns.shtml (announcing that the SEC’s “neither admit nor deny” policy has come under 
fire in the courts, the press, and Congress). 
76 See Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 333 (declining to enter a proposed consent judg-
ment because it contained a “no-admit” c
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“no-admit” clauses, even in cases in which misbehavior actually took 
place.77 
 “No-admit” clauses benefit defendants in a couple of important 
ways.78 First, “no-admit” clauses protect defendants against collateral 
estoppel, which prevents a party from contradicting a fact that was es-
tablished in prior litigation.79 For instance, in its 2012 decision in Rich-
man v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York implicitly applied principles of col-
lateral estoppel when it held that the plaintiff successfully alleged cul-
pability for material misrepresentation because the defendant acknowl-
edged, in an SEC consent judgment, that it made a “mistake” in its 
marketing materials.80 Alternatively, by including a “no-admit” clause, a 
defendant is able to ensure that any litigants it may face in the future 
will not be able to use the consent judgment as evidence of the defen-
dant’s wrongdoing.81 Second, “no-admit” clauses allow defendants to 
                                                                                                                      
SEC
hannon, supra note 39, at 256 (explaining that defendants are eager to 
sett uming and may generate negative publicity). 
t-
eral
ress concession rendered the 
clau
rities and Exchange Commission); Palazzolo, supra note 4. 
Def
’s allegations from the public). The SEC has promulgated a regulation regarding only 
the use of “no-deny” clauses; thus the SEC has left itself more flexibility in proposing “no-
admit” clauses than in proposing “no-deny” clauses. See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(e) (2012). Never-
theless, the SEC’s “neither admit nor deny” clauses contain both elements. See Johnson, 
supra note 2, at 647. 
77 See Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 333. 
78See Britton & Bo
le because litigation is costly and time-cons
79 Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 333; see Richman v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 868 F. 
Supp. 2d 261, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (sustaining the plaintiffs’ claim on principles of colla
 estoppel because, in a prior consent judgment, the defendant admitted to making a 
“mistake” in its marketing materials). Generally, collateral estoppel, also known as issue 
preclusion, prevents a party from relitigating an issue that was “actually litigated and de-
cided” and was “essential to the judgment.” 18 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Fed-
eral Practice § 131.10 (Coquillette et al. eds., 3d ed. 2013). Arguably, even a consent 
judgment that does not contain a “no-admit” clause should not give rise to any collateral 
estoppel effects because the SEC’s allegations are not actually litigated and decided. James, 
supra note 21, at 179 (noting that in consent judgments, “[t]he parties have not litigated 
the matters originally put in issue; they have settled them”). And, arguably, even if a judge 
makes formal findings relating to the consent judgment, the judgment still should not 
have collateral estoppel effect because the judge’s findings are not essential to the judg-
ment. Id. Nevertheless, a judge may give some collateral estoppel effect to a consent judg-
ment proposal. See infra note 80 and accompanying text. 
80 868 F. Supp. 2d at 281. The SEC’s consent judgment proposal contained a “no-
admit” clause, but the court found that Goldman Sachs’s exp
se inoperative. Id. at 278. 
81 Settlement Practices, supra note 7, at 6 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director of the 
Division of Enforcement, Secu
endants especially fear the use of consent judgments to support criminal liability. Set-
tlement Practices, supra note 7, at 6 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director of the Division 
of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission). 
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avoid the negative publicity that can accompany admissions.82 This pro-
vides an important benefit because untempered negative publicity may 
reduce stock values and damage personal reputations.83 
 In turn, the SEC often incorporates “no-admit” clauses into its 
consent judgment proposals because, although such clauses produce 
no direct benefits to the SEC, they encourage defendants to settle.84 
Alternatively, if the absence of a “no-admit” clause forces a defendant to 
reject the proposed consent judgment, the SEC will lose the advantages 
that accompany a quick, non-litigious resolution.85 Accordingly, a “no-
admit” clause is often a major settlement term for both parties.86 
C. Recent Reactions 
 As SEC enforcement actions emanating from the 2008 financial 
crisis have largely resulted in “no-admit” consent judgments, the SEC’s 
practices in this area have faced escalating criticism.87 Courts and 
commentators contend that “no-admit” consent judgments inade-
quately promote the public interest in deterring future misconduct and 
learning the full truth about the government’s allegations.88 
 Judge Rakoff’s decision in Citigroup I ignited much of the contro-
versy.89 In Citigroup I, Judge Rakoff rejected a consent judgment pro-
                                                                                                                      
Stanley Shares Slide, supra note 59; 
SEC
nd Exchange Commission) (“The reality is that 
man
ent in the SEC’s settlement terms); BofA II, 2010 WL 
6245
transparent financial 
mar
 Bank 
of A
 
82 Britton & Bohannon, supra note 39, at 256. 
83 See ABA Report, supra note 7, at 1093–94; Morgan 
 Charges Goldman Sachs, supra note 59. 
84 See Settlement Practices, supra note 7, at 6 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director of 
the Division of Enforcement, Securities a
y companies likely would refuse to settle cases if they were required to affirmatively 
admit unlawful conduct or facts related to that conduct.”). 
85 See id. (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director of the Division of Enforcement, Se-
curities and Exchange Commission). 
86 See id. (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director of the Division of Enforcement, Se-
curities and Exchange Commission). 
87 See, e.g., Circa Direct III, 2012 WL 3987610, at *5–7 (agreeing to enter a consent 
judgment, but expressing disappointm
81, at *5–6 (entering a “no-admit” SEC consent judgment, but disapprovingly noting 
that the judgment did not seem to strongly serve the public interest). 
88 See, e.g., Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332–33 (rejecting an SEC “no-admit” consent 
judgment proposal because it failed to promote the public interest in 
kets and it failed to adequately punish wrongdoers). See generally Brief for Barbara 
Black et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., No. 
11-5227, 2011 WL 6937373 (2011) [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief] (a brief filed by twenty 
law professors, opposing the SEC’s use of “no-admit” consent judgment proposals). 
89 Rieder et al., supra note 75, at 1. Judge Rakoff had caused similar controversy in 
2009 when he rejected a major consent judgment proposal offered by the SEC and
merica Corp. BofA I, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 512. Similarly, in 2011 in S.E.C. v. Vitesse Semi-
conductor Corp., Judge Rakoff criticized the SEC for its “confiden[ce] that the courts in this 
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posed by the SEC and Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. (“Citigroup”).90 
After a four-year investigation, the SEC filed a proposed consent judg-
ment along with its complaint, which asserted that Citigroup lied to 
investors about the anticipated future value of its investment prod-
ucts.91 Because the proposed consent judgment contained a “neither 
admit nor deny” clause, Citigroup neither admitted nor denied any of 
the SEC’s allegations.92 The proposed consent judgment contained 
three primary features.93 First, it required Citigroup to pay $285 million 
to a compensatory fund.94 Second, it enjoined Citigroup from violating 
section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933.95 Finally, it obligated Citigroup 
to adopt internal measures designed to prevent such future violations.96 
 Judge Rakoff rejected the proposed consent judgment because he 
believed the settlement was unfair, unreasonable, and inadequate, and 
                                                                                                                      
district were no more than rubber stamps” when the SEC proposed consent judgments 
“without so much as a word of explanation as to why the Court should approve these Con-
sent Judgments.” 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Nevertheless, Judge Rakoff 
later entered a revised consent judgment in the Bank of America case, and he immediately 
approved the consent judgment in the Vitesse Semiconductor case. See Vitesse Semiconductor, 
771 F. Supp. 2d at 310; BofA II, 2010 WL 624581, at *1. 
90 See 827 F. Supp. 2d at 330. The defendant in Citigroup I, Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 
is a subsidiary of Citigroup Inc. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc. and Subsidiaries, Consoli-
dated Statement of Financial Condition 4 (2012), available at http://www.citi.com/ 
investorinfo/cgmi_sfc.pdf. 
91 See Citigroup II, 673 F.3d at 161; Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 329. The investment 
products at issue in Citigroup I are known as “collateralized debt obligations” (“CDOs”), 
which are created by pooling together various debt instruments. See C.Y. Cyrus Chu, The 
Regulation of Structured Debts: Why? What? and How?, 19 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 443, 446 
(2010). These debt instruments are divided into different “tranches” according to their 
level of risk. Id. The SEC’s complaint alleged that Citigroup negligently misrepresented its 
CDOs as attractive investments and, therefore, violated 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2)–(3). Citi-
group I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 330. According to the complaint, the CDOs actually consisted of 
high-risk securities backed by subprime mortgages. Id. at 329. In fact, the SEC claimed, 
Citigroup bet against those assets by selling them short. Id.; see Black’s Law Dictionary 
1456 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a short sale as the sale of a security that the seller does not 
yet own and explaining that short sales are usually made when the seller expects the secu-
rity’s price to drop). The SEC also asserted that, although Citigroup told investors that an 
independent investment advisor selected the assets, Citigroup actually chose many of them 
itself. Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 329. When the subprime mortgage bubble burst, the 
fund’s value plummeted, and investors lost more than $700 million. Id. Citigroup collected 
approximately $160 million in profits. Id. at 330, 333. 
92 Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 330, 333. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. $160 million represented the profits Citigroup earned from the fund. Id. $30 mil-
lion embodied interest. Id. The other $95 million constituted a civil penalty. Id. 
95 Id. Section 17(a) is the same provision that the SEC alleged Citigroup to have vio-
lated in its complaint. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
96 Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 330. 
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fa d to promote the public interest.ile
t” clause.101 He observed that, because 
itig
sion could be rendered, Judge Rakoff’s 
97 According to Judge Rakoff, the 
SEC failed to sufficiently justify its proposal.98 Judge Rakoff reasoned 
that if Citigroup had actually violated the law, the settlement terms 
would have been unsatisfactory.99 Moreover, Judge Rakoff concluded 
that the settlement would have had little deterrent value where Citi-
group only viewed the monetary payment as a mere “cost of doing 
business,” and the internal measures Citigroup agreed to adopt would 
have been inexpensive.100 
 Additionally, Judge Rakoff took issue specifically with the consent 
judgment proposal’s “no-admi
C roup neither admitted nor denied the SEC’s accusations, the pub-
lic would never learn the truth about Citigroup’s behavior.102 This was 
an especially egregious flaw in the proposal, he explained, because the 
public has a strong interest in financial transparency in the aftermath 
of the 2008 financial crisis.103 Furthermore, Judge Rakoff reasoned, the 
clause would prevent litigants from collaterally estopping Citigroup’s 
defenses to future claims.104 
 Although the Second Circuit stayed the proceeding in the district 
court until an appellate deci
opinion has been persuasive to other courts considering proposed con-
sent judgments.105 Following Citigroup I, at least two district courts took 
                                                                                                                      
97 Id. at 332. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 333. 
–34. Judge Rakoff was especially concerned about deterrence given Citi-
grou atus as a recidivist. Id. Additionally, because the consent judgment did not re-
quir ute the money to defrauded investors, Judge Rakoff suspected that 
victi
v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc. (Citigroup II), the 
Seco yed the proceedings in the district court. See 673 F.3d at 169. The Second 
Circuit held that the district court may have wrongly concluded that the proposed consent 
judg
group I ); Letter from Judge Randa, supra note 12, at 1 
 
100 See id. 333
p’s st
e the SEC to distrib
ms might not receive compensation for their losses. Id. at 334. In a subsequent appel-
late brief, however, the SEC indicated that it intended to distribute funds to injured inves-
tors once it obtained court permission. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 52, SEC v. Citi-
group Global Mkts Inc., 673 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 11-5227). In any event, Judge 
Rakoff observed, the value of compensation to investors would be negligible. Citigroup I, 
827 F. Supp. 2d at 334. 
101 Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 330. 
102 Id. at 333. 
103 See id. at 335. 
104 See id. at 333. In March 2012, in SEC 
nd Circuit sta
ment was not in the public interest, inappropriately prejudged Citigroup’s liability, 
improperly failed to defer to the SEC’s discretion on public policy issues, and foiled any 
chance of compromise. Id. at 163–66. 
105 See, e.g., FTC v. Circa Direct LLC (Circa Direct I ), No. 11-2172, 2012 WL 589560, at 
*2 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 2012) (requesting a supplemental briefing regarding the parties’ con-
sent judgment proposal in light of Citi
1742 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1727 
pause before accepting proposed consent judgments containing “no-
admit” clauses.106 In December 2011, in SEC v. Koss Corp., the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin solicited writ-
ten justifications from the SEC for its proposed “no-admit” consent 
judgment.107 Although the court did not specifically address the pro-
posal’s “no-admit” clause, it drew significant attention by citing Judge 
Rakoff’s Citigroup I opinion.108 After the parties responded, the court 
approved the proposal.109 
 Similarly, in February 2012, the United States District Court for the 
ist
h the parties’ responses agreed that the four prongs of 
itig
whether the lack of an admission should factor into the court’s analysis 
regarding the public interest, and if there was anything the FTC could 
     
D rict of New Jersey in FTC v. Circa Direct LLP (Circa Direct I) requested 
answers to a number of questions before it would enter a “no-admit” 
consent judgment.110 Specifically, the court was considering an en-
forcement action brought by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
under the Federal Trade Commission Act alleging that the defendants 
falsely advertised the weight-loss capabilities of certain acai-berry-based 
products.111 
 Althoug
C roup I—fairness, reasonableness, adequacy, and the public inter-
est—were appropriately satisfied, in June 2012 the court requested ad-
ditional explanation as to how the proposed consent judgment was in 
the public interest.112 Specifically, the court asked the FTC to explain 
                                                                                                                 
(citing Citigroup I and asking the SEC and the defendants to justify their consent judgment 
proposal). 
106 See Circa Direct III, 2012 WL 3987610, at *1 (opining on the parties’ consent judg-
ment proposal after having requested a supplemental briefing in light of Citigroup I ); Ed-
war
Koss Corporation and its chief executive of maintaining 
inac
lements of the consent judgment would be too vague to enforce if en-
forc
se, Case Study: SEC v. Koss, Law 360 (Feb. 8, 2012, 
1:39
C, the court ob-
serv dgments brought under the Federal Trade Commission 
Act
d Wyatt, In Challenging S.E.C. Settlement, a Judge in Wisconsin Cites a Court in New York, 
N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 2011, at B4. 
107 Letter from Judge Randa, supra note 12, at 1; Wyatt, supra note 106 (describing the 
Koss case). The SEC accused the 
curate financial statements and failing to maintain adequate financial controls. Wyatt, 
supra note 106. 
108 See Letter from Judge Randa, supra note 12, at 1. The Koss court was concerned that 
the injunctive e
ement became necessary. Id. at 3. 
109 Order of February 22, 2012 at 5, SEC v. Koss Corp., No. 2:11-cv-00991-RTR (E.D. 
Wis. Feb. 22, 2012); see Bryan B. Hou
 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/307376/case-study-sec-v-koss. 
110 2012 WL 589560, at *1–2. 
111 Id. Although the FTC filed the enforcement action and not the SE
ed that courts treat consent ju
 and federal securities laws similarly. Id. at *2. 
112 FTC v. Circa Direct LLP (Circa Direct II ), No. 11–2172, 2012 WL 2178705, at *3, *5 
(D.N.J. June 13, 2012). 
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do to address the court’s concerns without requiring the defendant’s 
admission.113 The court observed that a settlement without an admis-
sion cannot provide the public with any additional information about 
the FTC’s allegations.114 
 Despite its concerns, the court deferred to the parties and ultimately 
approved a modified version of the proposed consent judgment.115 Nev-
ertheless, to promote public awareness of the FTC’s allegations, the court 
g, Housing and 
rba
     
conditioned entry of the consent judgment on publication of the sub-
stance of the FTC’s allegations on the FTC’s website.116 
 At least one United States Senator has also weighed in on the “no-
admit” consent judgment controversy.117 On February 14, 2013, in her 
first hearing as a member of the U.S. Senate’s Bankin
U n Affairs Committee, Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts 
asked bank regulators, including the SEC, about the last time they had 
taken a major financial institution to trial.118 Senator Warren opined 
that if banks could easily settle lawsuits brought against them, they 
would not have an incentive to follow the law and the public would lose 
out on days of enlightening testimony.119 Although Thomas Curry, 
Comptroller of the Currency, responded that a large number of con-
sent orders had been obtained, none of the bank regulators could 
identify the last time they had gone to trial against a major financial 
institution.120 Senator Warren lamented, “I’m really concerned that 
                                                                                                                 
113 Id. at *5, *7. 
114 Id. at *7. Additionally, the judge asked the parties to explain whether section 13(b) 
of th
7610, at *6. 
ebsite state, “The FTC had alleged that the 
Def
17, 2012, the U.S. House of Representa-
tives
e Federal Trade Commission Act applied to the case. Id. at *4. Section 13(b) author-
izes a court to order a permanent injunction only upon a showing of “proper proof” that 
the FTC is likely to succeed on the merits and that the injunction would be in the public 
interest. Id. Ultimately, however, the court agreed that section 13(b) did not apply. Circa 
Direct III, 2012 WL 3987610, at *3. 
115 Circa Direct III, 2012 WL 398
116 Id. at *7. The court required that the w
endants falsely marketed certain acai-berry based products as promoting rapid and 
substantial weight loss when, in fact, they do not.” Id. The court also required that the 
website list the FTC’s allegations, summarize the documentary evidence supporting the 
allegations, describe the science that backed the FTC’s claims, and include an electronic 
link to a declaration by the FTC’s nutritionist. Id. 
117 Grim, supra note 25. In addition, on May 
’ Committee on Financial Services heard testimony regarding the SEC’s settlement 
practices from the Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, Robert Khuzami. See 
Settlement Practices, supra note 7, at 1 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director of the Divi-
sion of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission). 
118 Grim, supra note 25. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
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‘too big to fail’ has become ‘too big for trial.’”121 Despite Senator War-
ren’s concerns, Congress has not responded with legislation that would 
require the SEC—or any other financial regulator—to change any of its 
current settlement policies.122 
 The SEC also reacted after Judge Rakoff’s Citigroup I decision.123 
On January 6, 2012, the agency announced that it would no longer al-
low defendants who had admitted to wrongdoing in a criminal case to 
fu
Executive- Centric Perspectives 
  
C  
Global Markets Inc. in approving or 
jec
                                                                                                                     
re se to admit wrongdoing in an SEC enforcement action arising from 
the same conduct.124 Some commentators, however, observed that the 
change would have little practical impact because civil admissions do 
not generate any effects that criminal admissions do not produce them-
selves.125 
II. Settling for “No-Admit” Settlement: Judiciary-Centric and 
Since Judge Rakoff’s decision in the 2011 United States District
ourt for the Southern District of New York case of SEC v. Citigroup
 (Citigroup I ), the role of the judiciary 
re ting “no-admit” consent judgment proposals has received consid-
erable attention.126 Four primary judiciary-centric models characterize 
the different methods by which courts evaluate proposed consent 
judgments.127 These include the contract model, the judicial act model, 
the hybrid model, and the functional model.128 These models support 
varying levels of judicial deference or scrutiny.129 
 
121 Id. 
122 Cf. id. (expressing concern that “‘too big to fail’ has become ‘too big for trial’”). 
rt Khuzami, Public Statement by SEC Staff: Recent Policy Change, U.S. Sec. & 
Exc m’n ( Jan. 7, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/ 
136 EC 
Cha
ted to 
crim hemselves to civil liability). 
udgments). 
123 See Robe
h. Com
5171489600#.Uiuk8bToOfQ [hereinafter SEC Public Statement]; Joe Palazzolo, S
nges ‘Neither Admit Nor Deny’ Policy, Wall St. J.L. Blog ( Jan. 6, 2012, 3:34 PM), 
http://blogswsj.com/law/2012/01/06/sec-changes-neither-admit-nor-deny-policy/. 
124 SEC Public Statement, supra note 123. 
125 See Palazzolo, supra note 123 (interviewing practitioners who explain that the 
change has little—if any—practical significance because companies that have admit
inal wrongdoing have already exposed t
126 See Rieder et al., supra note 75, at 1; SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc. (Citigroup I ), 
827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
127 See Mengler, supra note 14, at 294–95, 309–10, 327. 
128 Id.; see infra notes 139–179 and accompanying text (discussing the contract, judicial 
act, hybrid, and functional models of consent j
129 See Mengler, supra note 14, at 294–95, 309–10, 327. 
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 In contrast, an executive-centric perspective takes a different ap-
proach.130 Rather than examining the circumstances under which a 
ur
of deference or scru-
ny.
 There are fou  on consent judg-
ments.134 Subsectio l.135 Subsection 2 
pl
 argues for highly deferential treatment of par-
er this model, a court is encouraged to simply 
rub
 The contract model asserts that such judicial deference will reduce 
the parties’ enforcement costs, thereby facilitating settlement.141 Set-
     
co t should enter a particular consent judgment, the executive-centric 
perspective directly examines what terms an agency should or should 
not include in its consent judgment proposals.131 
 Section A of this Part outlines the four major judiciary-centric views 
on consent judgments and their varying degrees 
ti 132 Section B then describes the executive-centric perspective.133 
A. The Judiciary-Centric Perspective 
r primary judiciary-centric views
n 1 describes the contract mode
ex ains the judicial act model.136 Subsection 3 details the hybrid mod-
el.137 Finally, Subsection 4 discusses the functional model.138 
1. The Contract Model 
 The contract model
ties’ agreements.139 Und
“ ber stamp” a proposed consent judgment because the court is 
viewed merely as a vehicle to expeditiously enforce a contract between 
the parties.140 
                                                                                                                 
130 See Settlement Practices, supra note 7, at 2 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director of 
the ission) (elucidating the pro-
cess
Commission); SEC Enforcement 
Man
nd accompanying text. 
7 (discussing the contract, judicial 
act, s). 
Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Comm
 by which the SEC makes enforcement-action decisions); SEC Enforcement Manual, 
supra note 16, § 2.4 (describing how the SEC investigates violations of the securities laws, 
files enforcement actions, and settles with defendants). 
131 See Settlement Practices, supra note 7, at 2 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director of 
the Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange 
ual, supra note 16, § 2.4. 
132 See infra notes 134–179 and accompanying text. 
133 See infra notes 180–214 a
134 See Mengler, supra note 14, at 294–95, 309–10, 32
hybrid, and functional models of consent judgment
135 See infra notes 139–150 and accompanying text. 
136 See infra notes 151–164 and accompanying text. 
137 See infra notes 165–171 and accompanying text. 
138 See infra notes 172–179 and accompanying text. 
139 Mengler, supra note 14, at 292. 
140 See id. 
141 Id. at 313–14. 
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tlements enjoy a number of advantages over continued litigation.142 
First, the parties and the courts accrue savings from foregone litiga-
on
y would refuse to settle on terms that do not reflect 
                                                                                                                     
ti .143 Second, parties foreclose legal uncertainty associated with their 
disputes.144 Third, the voluntary nature of settlements might promote 
compliance more effectively than the involuntary nature of nonconsen-
sual judgments.145 Finally, in complex, multifaceted disputes, settle-
ments can produce more synergistic resolutions than courts might be 
able to fashion.146 
 Moreover, because parties’ agreements depend heavily on the ex-
pected outcome of litigation, the contract model asserts that compli-
ance with the law is built into parties’ consent judgment proposals.147 
Presumably, a part
the strengths of its legal position.148 Thus, according to the contract 
model, the compromises embodied by consent judgments not only 
provide significant benefits to the parties, they also respect the law.149 
Consequently, a court that adopts the contract model will only reject an 
obviously unjust consent judgment proposal that, for example, embod-
ies an illegal scheme.150 
 
 notes 143–146 and accompanying text. 
. 740, 749 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) 
(rea
s, 1987 U. Chi. Le-
gal
Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving 
Com
 
Settl
rocess of settlement is like the process of 
com
at each party to a settlement predicts how the court will apply 
the 
 to the contract model, “a 
con
142 Id. at. 314; infra
143 See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp
soning that the settlement of Vietnam War veterans’ Agent Orange claims would be 
beneficial because it would save the parties from litigation expenses). 
144 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgment
 F. 19, 22 (explaining that the parties often settle because they cannot be sure of the 
court’s decision if litigation continued). 
145 See Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, 
pliance Through Consent, 18 Law & Soc’y Rev. 11, 11 (1984) (describing the results of a 
statistical study that found that defendants were twice as likely to comply with settlement 
agreements than with adjudicatory orders regardless of the particular case’s characteristics). 
146 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory
ement Conference, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 485, 487 (1985) (suggesting that parties who settle 
can tailor solutions to their “polycentric needs”). 
147 Easterbrook, supra note 144, at 19 (“The p
pliance with the law.”). 
148 See id. (explaining th
law and adopts a compromise reflecting those predictions). 
149 See Mengler, supra note 14, at 314 (stating that, according
sent decree offers the advantages of private settlement backed by the court’s enforce-
ment powers, and none of the disadvantages”). 
150 Id. at 316. 
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2. The Judicial Act Model 
 The judicial act model construes consent judgments much differ-
ct model.151 The judicial act model asserts 
sly scrutinize all consent judgment propos-
ls b
e its integrity or embroil itself in a long, com-
lica
-
osa
ently than does the contra
that a court should rigorou
a ecause the consent judgment makes the court an active participant 
in the parties’ dispute.152 
 Although many proposals will still pass muster under this model, 
the court will be better equipped to ensure, through close examination, 
that it will not compromis
p ted relationship with the parties.153 This is important because by 
entering a consent judgment, a court commits itself to implementing 
the solution embodied by the judgment.154 Accordingly, a court will 
waste its own time and resources in the future if it approves consent 
judgments that will entangle it in complex relationships.155 To avoid 
this concern, the judicial model requires that the plain terms of the 
judgment do not impose excessive costs on the judicial system.156 
Moreover, under this model, the judgment’s terms cannot be ambigu-
ous.157 Ambiguous terms may inadequately define the court’s future 
role and can lead to costly and time-consuming secondary disputes.158 
 This model also asserts that as it is the judiciary’s job to uphold the 
law, courts must strive to protect their own integrity.159 Therefore, un-
der this model, a court should not approve a consent judgment pro
p l that has the potential to violate the law and harm third parties.160 
                                                                                                                      
151 Id. at 294–95 (contrasting the contract model and the judicial act model of consent 
judgments). 
152 See id. at 315, 320 (acknowledging that a court could become heavily involved in a 
long t dispute between the parties and indicating that a court that enters a 
con
d. at 315 (maintaining that judicial enforcement taxes judicial resources). 
petent 
Part
unt when evaluating a consent judgment pro-
posa
of the City of Chi., 814 F.2d 332, 341 (7th Cir. 1987) (rejecting a proposed con-
 
 and drawn-ou
sent judgment inherently throws its support behind the parties’ agreement). 
153 Id. 
154 See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 609 (1984) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting) (remarking that the implementation of a consent judgment often takes years). 
155 Mengler, supra note 14, at 315, 320. 
156 See i
157 Id. at 336 (recommending that a court resolve ambiguities in the parties’ compro-
mise before entering a consent judgment). 
158 Id. at 329. 
159 Ronald D. Rotunda, The Public Interest Appellant: Limitations on the Right of Com
ies to Settle Litigation Out of Court, 66 Nw. U. L. Rev. 199, 223 (1971) (arguing that a 
court should take its own integrity into acco
l). 
160 See, e.g., Stotts, 467 U.S. at 572–73 (refusing to extend a consent judgment that in-
cluded affirmative action hiring and promotion decisions to lay-off decisions, which would 
have affected the job retention of incumbent firefighters); Kasper v. Bd. of Election 
Comm’rs 
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Under the judicial act model, a court should also refuse to approve a 
consent judgment that does not further the purposes of the law under-
lying the complaint’s allegations.161 Similarly, the judicial act model 
might require that a court reject a consent judgment that inadequately 
approximates the probable outcome of litigation.162 A consent judg-
ment that compromises the court’s integrity in any of these ways could 
be especially problematic when it is published, as it may serve to guide 
third parties’ behaviors.163 Such published consent judgments could 
also prove troublesome when courts consider them for their preceden-
tial value.164 
3. The Hybrid Model 
l is unique in that it varies between treating con-
vary.166 
 In 1975, in United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., the U.S. Su-
preme Court adopted the hybrid model when it explained that consent 
     
 The hybrid mode
sent judgments under contract model principles and judicial act model 
principles.165 Hence, pursuant to the hybrid model, the level of judicial 
deference warranted for a particular proposed consent judgment will 
                                                                                                                 
sent judgment that would have patently contravened a statute governing the practices of 
the City of Chicago’s election commission); Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756, 759, 763 (7th 
Cir. 1985) (ordering the modification of a consent judgment between pretrial detainees 
and officials of Cook County, Illinois, that had forbidden “double bunking” county prison 
inmates because the public later developed a significant interest in expanding the prison’s 
capacity). 
161 See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 250 (1968) (recogniz-
ing that a trial court has a responsibility to achieve the Sherman Act’s objectives when 
deciding whether to approve or reject a consent judgment that would settle an enforce-
men
at would be impossible if the parties had resolved 
thei
 becomes apparent that their subsequent application as binding 
pre
nsent decrees are treated as contracts for some purposes 
but
nd judicial act models). 
t action brought under the Act). 
162 See Mengler, supra note 14, at 295. 
163 See id. at 317 (“Through publication as a court order, a consent decree may have 
deterrent effect on others in a way th
r dispute privately.”). 
164 ABA Report, supra note 14, at 1093 (“[S]ettlement releases . . . have articulated a 
body of new ‘law.’ . . . When one examines the origin of the rules of law articulated in 
these releases, however, it
cedent is problematic.”). 
165 See United States v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236–37 n.10 (1975) (“Con-
sent decrees and orders have attributes both of contracts and of judicial decrees. . . . Be-
cause of this dual character, co
 not for others.”). 
166 See id. (declaring that consent judgments should be treated like contracts for some 
purposes and like judicial acts for other purposes); Mengler, supra note 14, at 294–95 (con-
trasting the contract a
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judgments should be treated differently for different purposes.167 Un-
fortunately, the Supreme Court has not lucidly applied its Continental 
akiB ng jurisprudence in the decades since.168 Instead, the Court has 
arguably utilized both the contract model and the judicial act model in 
approval, interpretation, and modification cases alike.169 The Court has 
been inconsistent in its application of a particular model, even when 
the parties before the Court were the same.170 Because a workable for-
                                                                                                                      
167 See 420 U.S. at 236–37 n.10. 
168 Mengler,  note 14, at 309–10. supra
169 Id. at 296–310. The Supreme Court has adopted both the contract and judicial 
mod
o. v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court 
imp del for approval purposes by refusing to allow a small 
mus  judgment settlement between the government 
and
 U.S. 
at 6
 the 
con
 
els when approving consent judgments. See Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001, 
1001–02 (1983); Sam Fox Publ’g Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 685–86, 689 (1961). 
For example, in 1961 in Sam Fox Publishing C
licitly embraced the contract mo
ic publisher to intervene in a consent
 the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), which arguably 
permitted large music publishers to restrain competition by controlling ASCAP board 
positions. See 366 U.S. at 685–86, 689. The Court reasoned that intervention was inappro-
priate because the parties settled voluntarily and the consent judgment did not prevent 
the small publisher from challenging ASCAP’s behavior itself. Id. at 689. Nevertheless, in 
1983 in Maryland v. United States, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a consent judg-
ment where the district court had entered its judgment only after mandating alterations 
geared toward the public interest. See 460 U.S. at 1001–02 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has adopted both the contract and judicial models 
when interpreting consent judgments. See Stotts, 467 U.S. at 572–73; Cont’l Baking, 420 U.S. 
at 225–26; United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 678 (1971) For example, in 1971 
in United States v. Armour & Co., the Supreme Court implicitly endorsed the contract model 
of consent judgments for interpretation purposes when the Court read a consent judg-
ment narrowly because the parties did not contemplate the situation at hand. See 402
78. Similarly, in 1984 in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, the Supreme Court 
refused to extend a consent judgment that instituted affirmative action in the hiring, pro-
motion, and lay-offs of Memphis firefighters. 467 U.S. at 572–73. In contrast, in 1975 in 
United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., the Supreme Court arguably adopted the judicial 
act model when it levied severe sanctions on a party for its “continuing failure or neglect to 
obey” a consent judgment. See 420 U.S. at 225. The Court’s decision to levy such sanctions 
was striking because the Court chose such sanctions over the lighter penalties available 
under the Clayton Act and the FTC Act for a single consent judgment violation. See id. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has adopted both the contract and judicial models 
when modifying consent judgments. See Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556, 562–
64 (1942); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 109–10, 120 (1932). For example, in 
1932 in United States v. Swift & Co., the Supreme Court implicitly accepted the contract 
model for modification purposes by refusing to modify the same consent judgment at issue 
in Armour. See Swift, 286 U.S. at 109–10, 120; see also Armour, 402 U.S. at 678 (describing
sent judgment which prohibited Armour & Co. from dealing in food retail). But in 
1942 in Chrysler Corp. v. United States, the Supreme Court implicitly adopted the judicial act 
model when it permitted the modification of a consent judgment between Chrysler Cor-
poration and the government in light of the judgment’s basic purpose. See 316 U.S. at 562–
64. 
170 Mengler, supra note 14, at 310. For example, the Justice Department was a party to 
the consent judgments in both Armour and Continental Baking. Id. Nevertheless, the Su-
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mulation of the hybrid model has not yet emerged, lower courts have 
considerable leeway to decide appropriate levels of deference or scru-
tiny.171 
4. The Functional Model 
e models, the functional model spurns the 
aradigms altogether and endorses a moder-
 
 b
judgment as it is perceived by an executive government agency.179 
 Unlike the other thre
contract and judicial act p
ate level of deference and scrutiny.172 The functional model asserts that 
the contract model underestimates the resources a court may need to 
expend to enforce a consent judgment while also largely disregarding 
the rights of third parties.173 This model also finds weakness in the ju-
dicial act model because it tends to sacrifice the benefits of settle-
ment.174 
 The functional model requires a more moderate level of deference
in etween the two poles staked by the contract model and the judicial 
act model.175 Under the functional model, a court should take into ac-
count all the risks and rewards of a potential consent judgment.176 Ac-
cordingly, to ensure that the court does not devote excessive resources 
to a complex relationship between the parties, the court should de-
mand unambiguous terms that do not require substantial judicial in-
volvement.177 Such judiciary-centric models only consider a proposed 
consent judgment as it is perceived by a court.178 It is necessary to 
adopt an executive-centric approach to consider a proposed consent 
                                                                                                                      
preme Court utilized contractual concepts in Armour, but judicial act concepts in Continen-
tal Baking. See Cont’l Baking, 420 U.S. at 225–26; Armour, 402 U.S. at 677–79. 
d accompanying text (explaining the high level of 
defe e parties’ agreement under the contract model), with supra notes 
152 ccompanying text (describing the exacting level of scrutiny under which a 
cour  the parties’ agreement under the judicial act model). 
the public inter-
est— ny equitable relief.”); Mengler, supra note 14, at 
336
171 Mengler, supra note 14, at 311 (suggesting that lower courts could apply one model 
or the other whenever they so see fit). 
172 See id. at 327. 
173 See id. 
174 Id. at 321. 
175 Compare supra notes 139–140 an
rence given to th
–154 and a
t must analyze
176 See Mengler, supra note 14, at 321. 
177 Mengler, supra note 14, at 336. 
178 See Duran, 760 F.2d at 759 (“When an equity decree affects other people besides the 
parties to it, the judge must take account of the interest of those people—
in his decision whether to grant or de
. 
179 See Mengler, supra note 14, at 336 (cautioning against revising parties’ agreements 
“on the basis of some unharnessed concept of justice”). 
2013] SEC “No-Admit” Consent Judgment Proposals 1751 
B. A Different Approach: The Executive-Centric Perspective 
 Unfortunately, each of the four judiciary-centric models has its lim-
its.180 Mo r a pro-
posed co roposed 
ns
Li
 
fies the types of con-
 Such a perspective 
es
egates the selection of terms to the discretion of the parties, the parties 
may only be willing to agree to a narrow set of potential consent judg-
                                                                                                              
st obviously, such judiciary-centric models only conside
nsent judgment when it appears in court.181 When a p
co ent judgment appears before an executive government agency, 
however, it will be necessary to adopt an executive-centric approach.182 
 Subsection 1 defines the limits of the judiciary-centric perspec-
tive.183 Subsection 2 then describes the executive-centric perspective.184 
1. mitations of the Judiciary-Centric Perspective 
 The judiciary-centric perspective only considers a circumscribed
domain.185 A judiciary-centric viewpoint only identi
sent judgments a court will or will not approve.186
do  not, however, identify specific terms that a party, in light of the 
various factors that influence its decision to settle, considers in con-
structing its agreement.187 In other words, although a judiciary-centric 
perspective speaks to the terms that a court may accept, it is not indica-
tive of the terms that a party may be willing to negotiate in the first in-
stance.188 
 For example, although the contract model almost completely del-
        
ttlement between the SEC and the 
Ban
unding a limited judicial role in evaluating a proposed consent judgment); 
Citig
nt practices without focusing on court requirements). 
ing that an SEC consent judgment 
pro roving it anyway). 
diciary). 
 influ-
ence consent judgment proposals). 
180 See SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp. (BofA II ), Nos. 09 Civ. 6829, 10 Civ. 0215, 2010 WL 
624581, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010) (approving a se
k of America despite misgivings); SEC Enforcement Manual, supra note 16, § 2.4 
(explaining that the Commission, Division Director, or Secretary must authorize all SEC 
settlements). 
181 See, e.g., SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc. (Citigroup II ), 673 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 
2012) (propo
roup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 335 (embracing a more expansive judicial role in evaluating 
a proposed consent judgment). 
182 See, e.g., ABA Report, supra note 7, at 1169 (typifying the executive-perspective by ad-
vocating changes to SEC settleme
183 See infra notes 185–202 and accompanying text. 
184 See infra notes 203–214 and accompanying text. 
185 See BofA II, 2010 WL 624581, at *5–6 (determin
posal contains serious problems, but reluctantly app
186 See Mengler, supra note 14, at 294–95 (showing that the contract model and the ju-
dicial act model merely represent different approaches to the role of the ju
187 See id. 
188 See BofA II, 2010 WL 624581, at *6 (acknowledging a court’s limited ability to
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ments in the first instance.189 And although the judicial act model lim-
its the realm of consent judgments that are acceptable to the court, the 
artp ies may be willing to agree to a wide range of settlements even with-
in that court’s approved realm.190 The hybrid model fails in these same 
ways, as it simply mimics the contract model or the judicial act model, 
depending on the situation.191 The functional model also leaves un-
touched the terms that the parties are unwilling to agree to because a 
court acting under this model gives the parties discretion to negoti-
ate.192 
 The judiciary-centric perspective falls short of omniscience be-
cause, even if a court is intimately familiar with the details of a case, the 
court is not necessarily privy to all the considerations that affect a par-
ty’s settlement decision.193 For example, the court may not understand 
                                                                                                                      
189 See Mengler, supra note 14, at 294 (observing that the contract model advocates judi-
cial deference); supra notes 139–140 and accompanying text (describing the way in which the 
contract model encourages a court to “rubber stamp” the parties’ proposed consent judg-
ments). 
 out better, or worse, after a full trial, and the 
ic executive agency such as the S.E.C., the factors include also an assess-
Id. (ci
190 See Mengler, supra note 14, at 295 (indicating that, under the judicial act model, a 
court rigorously scrutinizes a proposed consent judgment); supra notes 152–153 and ac-
com yipan ng text (describing how the judicial act model calls for a high level of judicial 
scrutiny). 
191 See Cont’l Baking, 420 U.S. at 236–37 n.10; Mengler, supra note 14, at 294–95; supra 
notes 165–166 and accompanying text (describing how the hybrid model corresponds with 
both the contract model and judicial act model in different circumstances and explaining 
how the level of deference given under the hybrid model will vary). 
192 See Mengler, supra note 14, at 327 (stating that the functional model requires that a 
court defer less substantially to the parties than under the contract model while also man-
datin hag t t a court scrutinize the parties’ agreement less rigorously than under the judicial 
act model); supra notes 175–179 and accompanying text (noting the degree of deference 
with which a court should review consent judgment proposals under the functional mod-
el). The contract, judicial act, and hybrid models also give the parties room to negotiate. 
See s  n 71 aupra otes 139–1 nd accompanying text (outlining the approaches to the contract, 
judicial act, and hybrid models). 
193 See Citigroup II, 673 F.3d at 164. In its 2012 Citigroup II decision, the Second Circuit 
observed: 
 The numerous factors that affect a litigant’s decision whether to compro-
mise a case or litigate it to the end include the value of the particular pro-
posed compromise, the perceived likelihood of obtaining a still better settle-
ment, the prospects of coming
resources that would need to be expended in the attempt. In the case of a 
publ
ment of how the public interest is best served. These are precisely the factors 
that the Supreme Court has recognized as making a discretion agency deci-
sion unsuitable for judicial review. 
ting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32(1985)). 
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the party’s budgetary situation or historical litigation success.194 These 
factors, however, could shape the party’s entire settlement strategy.195 
 Moreover, even if a court is confident that it could unilaterally 
fashion a consent judgment that the parties would have proposed on 
their own, practically, it could not do so.196 A court does not propose 
consent judgments to itself, but can only respond to the proposals that 
the parties present to the court.197 Consequently, a court cannot pick 
and choose the terms it wants the parties to negotiate and select in the 
first instance.198 Of course, by rejecting certain consent judgment pro-
posals, a court may indirectly influence the negotiation process or set-
tlement schemes.199 After all, prudent parties will limit their negotia-
tions to solutions the court might approve.200 But otherwise, the parties 
enjoy free reign.201 The court plays a purely reactive role.202 
2. The Executive-Centric Perspective 
 The executive-centric perspective considers issues left unexplored 
by the judiciary-centric perspective in that it evaluates consent judg-
ment n a 
cour g to 
                                       
s from the perspective of an executive agency—rather tha
t—and ascertains the terms that the agency would be willin
                                                                               
194 See id.; Settlement Practices, supra note 7, at 2 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director 
of the Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission) (indicating that in 
making a settlement decision the SEC will analyze the strength of the case, the delay in 
returning funds to investors, and the resources the SEC has available). 
195 See Citigroup II, 673 F.3d at 164; Settlement Practices, supra note 7, at 2 (statement of 
Robert Khuzami, Director of the Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Com-
mission). 
196 See SEC Enforcement Manual, supra note 16, § 2.5.1 (noting that “while the 
Commission has delegated certain authority to the Division Director or the Secretary, most 
settlements of previously authorized enforcement actions . . . require Commission authori-
zation”). 
197 See BofA II, 2010 WL 624581, at *6 (acknowledging that a court does not approve an 
SEC consent judgment de novo, but rather must evaluate it as the SEC has presented it); 
SEC Enforcement Manual, supra note 16, § 2.5.1. 
198 See BofA II, 2010 WL 624581, at *6 (acknowledging that a court does not approve an 
SEC consent judgment de novo, but rather must evaluate it as the SEC has presented it); 
SEC Enforcement Manual, supra note 16, § 2.5.1. 
199 See Rieder et al., supra note 75, at 4 (remarking that the SEC will have to adjust its 
settlements with defendants if courts begin to reject SEC consent judgments as currently 
formulated). 
200 See id. 
201 See BofA II, 2010 WL 624581, at *6 (approving a consent judgment although the 
court would have recommended a different one). 
202 See id. 
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negotiate.203 As such, the executive-centric perspective evaluates set-
emtl ent terms based on the information available to the agency rather 
than the information available to the court.204 Additionally, the execu-
tive-centric perspective also assumes the decision-making position of 
one of the parties that proactively crafts the proposal that ultimately 
ends up before the bench.205 
 The information the agency has available extends beyond the evi-
dence the agency has amassed for use in a particular enforcement ac-
tion.206 Specifically, the agency inherently knows the funds at the agen-
cy’s disposal, the other opportunities the agency may wish to pursue, 
and the agency’s historical success in similar enforcement actions.207 
husT , the agency is able to make decisions regarding a potential con-
sent judgment proposal by analyzing the entire landscape in which that 
consent judgment proposal would be situated.208 The agency can see 
how the inclusion or omission of particular terms impacts other aspects 
of the agency’s practice.209 For example, the SEC may recognize that 
the removal of a “no-admit” clause would be detrimental in that its re-
moval would discourage favorable settlements, increase litigation, and 
                                                                                                                      
203 See, e.g., ABA Report, supra note 7, at 1169 (exemplifying the executive-centric per-
spective by recommending changes to SEC consent judgment proposals without focusing 
on t
nge Commission) (disclosing the vari-
ous
i, Director of 
the ssion) (stating that the SEC 
gath
EC Enforcement 
Ma
n); SEC Enforcement 
Ma
n) (“There is little dis-
put
he minimum standard a court might require). 
204 See Settlement Practices, supra note 7, at 2 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director of 
the Division of Enforcement, Securities and Excha
 items the SEC considers when drawing up consent judgment proposals). 
205 See SEC Enforcement Manual, supra note 16, § 2.5.1. 
206 See Settlement Practices, supra note 7, at 2 (statement of Robert Khuzam
Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commi
ers evidence, discusses investigative and legal proceedings with the defendant, evalu-
ates the strength of the evidence, and takes into account its available resources); SEC En-
forcement Manual, supra note 16, § 2.4 (describing the Wells process, by which the SEC 
communicates with potential defendants); Coffee & Sale, supra note 30, at 55 (discussing 
how the SEC has regulated the national securities markets since 1934). 
207 See Settlement Practices, supra note 7, at 2 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director of 
the Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission); S
nual, supra note 16, § 2.4; Coffee & Sale, supra note 30, at 55. 
208 See Settlement Practices, supra note 7, at 2 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director of 
the Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commissio
nual, supra note 16, § 2.4; Coffee & Sale, supra note 30, at 55. 
209 See Settlement Practices, supra note 7, at 6 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director of 
the Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commissio
e that if ‘neither-admit-nor-deny’ settlements were eliminated, and cases could be re-
solved only if the defendant admitted the facts constituting the violation, or was found 
liable by a court or jury, there would be far fewer settlements, and much greater delay in 
resolving matters and bringing relief to harmed investors.”). 
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drain resources from other endeavors.210 Alternatively, the SEC could 
conclude that a “no-admit” clause actually impairs its overall goal of 
promoting the public interest.211 
 The executive-centric perspective also views the decision-making 
process from the vantage point of a party that devises the consent judg-
 
Indicates That the SEC Should Change Its Approach  
 T t the 
ideal meth ment pro-
osa
significant changes to its settlement practices by refusing to settle on a 
                                                                                                                     
ment proposal, in the first instance, before it is considered by a court.212 
Unlike a court, an agency can pick and choose the terms it wants to in-
clude or omit in its proposal.213 Although wise parties will consider the 
standards utilized by a court in deciding to effectuate a proposed con-
sent judgment, the executive-centric approach recognizes that parties 
may nevertheless propose any settlement scheme they so desire.214 
III. A View Through The Executive-Centric Perspective
to “No-Admit” Consent Judgment Proposals 
he judiciary-centric perspective of consent judgments is no
od to evaluate the SEC’s “no-admit” consent judg
p ls.215 Such a perspective fails to illuminate all the factors that truly 
influence the SEC’s settlement decisions, and it assumes the position of 
a reactive actor instead of a proactive actor.216 To ascertain whether the 
SEC should change its approach to “no-admit” consent judgment pro-
posals, an executive-centric perspective should be adopted.217 The ex-
ecutive-centric perspective indicates that the SEC should make some 
 
210 See id.; supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text (explaining the benefits of “no-
 unilaterally amended its set-
tlem
). 
iv. 6829, 10 Civ. 0215, 2010 
WL  *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010) (entering a proposed consent judgment in spite 
of it te 7, at 1169 (proposing alterations to SEC 
con
gencies); SEC 
Enf
practices without regard to court requirements). 
action” clauses from an SEC perspective). 
211 See Palazzolo, supra note 123 (reporting that the SEC
ent policy to provide that defendants would be required to admit allegations that had 
been proven in a prior criminal proceeding
212 See SEC Enforcement Manual, supra note 16, § 2.5.1. 
213 See id. 
214 See id.; Rieder et al., supra note 75, at 4. 
215 Compare SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp. (BofA II ), Nos. 09 C
624581, at
s putative flaws), with ABA Report, supra no
sent judgment practices without considering court-imposed standards). 
216 See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc. (Citigroup II ), 673 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 
2012) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 387, 866 
(1984)) (holding that courts should not make policy choices for executive a
orcement Manual, supra note 16, § 2.5.1 (indicating that the SEC has sole authority 
to settle its enforcement actions). 
217 Compare BofA II, 2010 WL 624581, at *6 (entering a proposed consent judgment de-
spite the court’s displeasure), with ABA Report, supra note 7, at 1169 (recommending 
changes to SEC consent judgment 
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“no-admit” basis in some cases, limiting the scope of its “no-admit” 
clauses in other cases, and providing thorough explanations for its con-
sent judgment proposals in all cases.218 
 Section A of this Part contends that SEC “no-admit” consent 
judgment proposals should be analyzed from an executive-centric per-
spective.219 Section B then argues that the SEC should exclude “no-
m
t Judgment Proposals 
  
e -
centric per e can only 
at those terms may pro-
duce.224 A court generally only has access to the evidence presented to 
     
ad it” clauses in some cases, narrow their scope in others, and fully 
explain their use or disuse in all cases.220 
A. The Executive-Centric Perspective Provides a Superior Vantage Point from 
Which to Assess the SEC’s Consen
When analyzing SEC “no-admit” consent judgment proposals, the
xecutive-centric perspective offers distinct advantages over a judiciary
spective.221 Whereas a judiciary-centric perspectiv
discern the most egregious defects in consent judgment proposals, an 
executive-centric perspective can pinpoint discrete deficiencies.222 Ad-
ditionally, whereas criticism levied from the judiciary-centric perspec-
tive exerts an indirect effect on settlement terms, an executive-centric 
critique speaks directly to term selection.223 
 The SEC is in a better position than a court to evaluate the proper 
terms of a consent judgment because the SEC enjoys a greater wealth 
of information about the consequences th
                                                                                                                 
218 See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc. (Citigroup I ), 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (suggesting that the SEC should provide more thorough justifications for its proposed 
con
ying text. 
 the court could not reject a poorly 
craf ary responsibility for enforcing the 
secu
 with ABA 
Rep
ction). 
 decisions deserve some level 
 
sent judgments); ABA Report, supra note 7, at 1169 (contending that the SEC should limit 
the breadth of its “neither admit nor deny” clauses); James, supra note 21, at 193 (arguing 
that parties should convey how they intend to be bound by a consent judgment in order to 
obtain the collateral estoppel effects they desire); Johnson, supra note 2, at 679 (recommend-
ing that the SEC refuse to settle novel cases). 
219 See infra notes 221–241 and accompanying text. 
220 See infra notes 242–297 and accompan
221 See BofA II, 2010 WL 624581, at *6 (holding that
ted consent judgment because the SEC had the prim
rities laws); ABA Report, supra note 7, at 1169 (suggesting improvements to the SEC’s use 
of “neither admit nor deny” clauses irrespective of court approval or disapproval). 
222 Compare BofA II, 2010 WL 624581, at *6 (determining that an SEC consent judg-
ment proposal contains serious problems, but reluctantly approving it anyway),
ort, supra note 7, at 1169 (suggesting specific improvements to the scope of SEC “nei-
ther admit nor deny” clauses at the drafting stages). 
223 See SEC Enforcement Manual, supra note 16, § 2.5.1 (demonstrating that the SEC 
always authorizes the settlement of an enforcement a
224 See BofA II, 2010 WL 624851, at *6 (observing that the SEC has been charged with 
regulating the national securities markets and, therefore, its
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it  a particular case. in
                                                                                                                     
225 The SEC, however, conducts the investigation 
that leads to the filing of an enforcement action; negotiates with the 
defendant; knows what resources the agency has available to allocate to 
its various ventures; and has extensive experience in its regulatory 
field.226 Consequently, the breadth of the information at the SEC’s dis-
posal far surpasses the breadth of information at the court’s disposal.227 
To the extent the court disagrees with the terms contained in an SEC 
consent judgment proposal, it disagrees with an extremely knowledge-
able and experienced party.228 Although a consent judgment proposal 
may warrant a court’s repudiation, it must raise significant concerns 
before the court can confidently identify impropriety.229 Indeed, even a 
relatively exacting court may grant the SEC considerable discretion 
over its settlement arrangements in some instances.230 Judge Rakoff, for 
instance, has grudgingly acknowledged that the SEC—not the judici-
ary—shoulders the primary responsibility for regulating the securities 
market.231 Thus, the executive-centric perspective can turn a more ex-
 
of d
to make an educated decision respecting the SEC’s proposed consent judg-
men
sion of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission); SEC Enforcement 
Man
nt of Robert Khuzami, 
Dire
sion of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission); SEC Enforcement 
Man
cision because the SEC 
bea
erican Corporation, Judge Rakoff wrote: 
 
eference); Settlement Practices, supra note 7, at 2 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Direc-
tor of the Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission) (detailing the 
processes by which the SEC enforces the securities laws); SEC Enforcement Manual, 
supra note 16, § 2.4 (describing the Wells process); Coffee & Sale, supra note 30, at 55 
(indicating that the SEC has regulated the national securities markets for almost eighty 
years). 
225 See Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332 (lamenting that the court did not have enough 
information 
t). 
226 See Settlement Practices, supra note 7, at 2 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director of 
the Divi
ual, supra note 16, § 2.4; Coffee & Sale, supra note 30, at 55. 
227 Compare Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332 (noting the lack of information provided 
to the court), with Settlement Practices, supra note 7, at 2 (stateme
ctor of the Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission) (detailing 
the processes by which the SEC enforces the securities laws), SEC Enforcement Manual, 
supra note 16, § 2.4 (describing the Wells process), and Coffee & Sale, supra note 30, at 55 
(indicating that the SEC has regulated the national securities markets for almost eighty 
years). 
228 See Settlement Practices, supra note 7, at 2 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director of 
the Divi
ual, supra note 16, § 2.4; Coffee & Sale, supra note 30, at 55. 
229 See BofA II, 2010 WL 624581, at *6 (expressing dissatisfaction with a consent judg-
ment proposal, but ultimately deferring to the SEC’s settlement de
rs the principal responsibility for enforcement of the securities laws). 
230 See, e.g., id. (noting that the SEC has the primary responsibility for regulating the 
securities markets). 
231 See id. In 2010, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York case 
of SEC v. Bank of Am
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acting eye on consent judgments than can the judiciary-centric per-
spective.232 
 Furthermore, the SEC plays a more direct role in term selection 
than a court because the SEC—not the court—negotiates with defen-
dants to formulate consent judgment proposals.233 A court cannot im-
ose
line” to prolonged litigation, even if pro-
ng
p  its own settlement terms on the parties.234 Accordingly, the execu-
tive-centric perspective, with its focus directly on the agency, reviews the 
actions of the party that takes the most proactive role in crafting a con-
sent judgment proposal.235 
 Of course, the SEC may not always choose to submit a consent 
judgment proposal that best serves the public interest.236 The SEC 
might prefer a “quick head
lo ed litigation would better promote the public interest.237 Addition-
ally, SEC officials might be biased toward financial institutions, and 
therefore willing to offer defendants settlement terms that a well-
informed public would find too lenient.238 Or the SEC might simply 
suffer from administrative inertia.239 These possibilities, however, only 
                                                                                                                      
 So should the Court approve the proposed settlement as being fair, rea-
sonable, adequate, and in the public interest? If the Court were deciding that 
t to give substantial 
Id. 
232 state-
ment  Ex-
chang Sale, 
supra  55. 
233 See SEC Enforcement Manual, supra note 16, § 2.4 (elucidating the Wells process 
and
 judicial restraint). 
uation of the Ash Council 
Pro
es it must rely more heavily upon its settled pro-
cedures and resists substantial change). 
question solely on the merits—de novo, as the lawyers say—the Court would 
reject the settlement as inadequate and misguided. But as both parties never 
hesitate to remind the Court, the law requires the Cour
deference to the S.E.C. as the regulatory body having primary responsibility 
for policing the securities markets, especially with respect to matters of trans-
parency. 
 See Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332; Settlement Practices, supra note 7, at 2 (
of Robert Khuzami, Director of the Division of Enforcement, Securities and
e Commission); SEC Enforcement Manual, supra note 16, § 2.4; Coffee & 
note 30, at
 stating that the SEC authorizes all enforcement-action settlements). 
234 See BofA II, 2010 WL 642581, at *6 (disapproving the terms of a consent judgment 
between the SEC and Bank of America Corporation, but ultimately entering the consent 
judgment as an act of
235 See SEC Enforcement Manual, supra note 16, § 2.5.1 (demonstrating that the SEC 
always authorizes the settlement of an enforcement action). 
236 See, e.g., Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 333 (rejecting a consent judgment proposal 
because it did not include any confessions of wrongdoing even though the public would 
have benefitted from such confessions). 
237 Id. 
238 Roger G. Noll, Reforming Regulation: An Eval
posals 41 (1971) (suggesting that some regulators have a pro-industry bias). 
239 Marver H. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission 87 
(1955) (arguing that as an agency matur
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highlight the importance of executive-centric problem solving.240 If 
improper considerations enter into the SEC’s decision-making process, 
the executive-centric proposal can more accurately identify and remedy 
the issue than can the judiciary-centric perspective because the execu-
tive-centric perspective is better equipped to recognize the problem 
and implement a solution.241 
B. The SEC Should Change Its Approach to “No-Admit”  
Consent Judgment Proposals 
 An ex ld refine 
its use of “no-admit” c ls.242 The SEC’s track 
eco
 establish past 
wrongdoing, all with transparency and candor, thereby promoting the 
     
ecutive-centric perspective reveals that the SEC shou
onsent judgment proposa
r rd is clear.243 The agency settles most of the enforcement actions it 
files, and the vast majority of those settlements are effectuated by “no-
admit” consent judgments.244 SEC “no-admit” clauses extend to the en-
tirety of the SEC’s allegations, and they fail to specify the collateral ef-
fects they are intended to prevent.245 Moreover, the SEC does not al-
ways provide ample justification for its “no-admit” consent judgment 
proposals.246 The SEC should change these practices.247 
 Collectively, this Section argues that the SEC can adopt changes in 
its practices that would deter future wrongdoing and
                                                                                                                 
240 See supra notes 224–235 and accompanying text. 
241 See supra notes 224–235 and accompanying text. 
ressing disappointment in the evi-
den Johnson, supra note 2, at 679 (en-
cou
, supra note 7, at 1169 (asserting that the SEC could restrict the scope 
of it ). 
cision in SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Judge 
Rak
nding that the SEC should limit the breadth of 
its “
242 See, e.g., Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332 (exp
tiary basis for an SEC consent judgment proposal); 
raging the SEC to exempt novel cases from settlement). 
243 See Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332; ABA Report, supra note 7, at 1169; Johnson, 
supra note 2, at 647. 
244 Johnson, supra note 2, at 647. 
245 See ABA Report
s “neither admit nor deny” clauses
246 See Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332. For instance, in the 2011 U.S District Court 
for the Southern District of New York de
off opined that “the proposed Consent Judgment is neither fair, nor reasonable, nor 
adequate, nor in the public interest. Most fundamentally, this is because it does not pro-
vide the Court with a sufficient evidentiary basis to know whether the requested relief is 
justified under any of these standards.” Id. 
247 See id. at 332 (recommending that courts require the SEC to fully litigate novel cas-
es); ABA Report, supra note 7, at 1169 (conte
neither admit nor deny” clauses); James, supra note 21, at 193 (arguing that parties 
should convey how they intend to be bound by a consent judgment in order to obtain the 
collateral estoppel effects they desire); Johnson, supra note 2, at 679 (recommending that 
the SEC refuse to settle novel cases). 
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p ic interest and achieving optimal results.ubl
l, 
fit 
gre m the clear and conclusive establishment of wrongdoing in 
248 Subsection 1 argues 
that the SEC should require defendants to admit to wrongdoing in 
large, novel, and high-profile cases or, alternatively, omit “no-admit” 
clauses in those types of cases.249 Subsection 2 argues that when some 
aspects of a case prove more important than others, the SEC should 
limit the “no-admit” clauses it utilizes to narrower sets of allegations 
and collateral estoppel effects.250 Finally, Subsection 3 argues that the 
SEC should provide a court with a thorough explanation for its deci-
sion to include or exclude a “no-admit” clause.251 
1. The Use Of “No-Admit” Clauses in Large, Novel, and High-Profile 
Cases 
 The SEC should require admissions of misconduct in large, nove
and high-profile enforcement actions because the public will bene
atly fro
such cases.252 In a large case where a defendant’s behavior has harmed 
a broad swath of the public, an admission may deter future misbehavior 
that could cause widespread damage.253 An admission could also ex-
pose the defendant to collateral estoppel effects, making it unnecessary 
for future claimants to reestablish misdeeds.254 In novel cases, an ad-
mission would provide persuasive evidence that the defendant’s con-
duct was legally impermissible.255 Consequently, the admission would 
                                                                                                                      
248 See infra notes 252–297 and accompanying text. 
249 See infra notes 252–273 and accompanying text. 
ompanying text. 
 the SEC not settle novel cases). See 
gene s “no-admit” consent judgment 
pro
g that a “no-admit” consent judg-
men
omplaint are true, this is a very good deal for Citigroup; and, even if they are 
untr
te 21, at 179 (noting that courts 
hav
250 See infra notes 274–280 and accompanying text. 
251 See infra notes 281–297 and acc
252 See Johnson, supra note 2, at 679 (proposing that
rally Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (criticizing the SEC’
posals). 
253 See Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 333 (reasonin
t would “settle[] what it states was a broad-ranging four-year investigation by the S.E.C. 
of Citigroup’s mortgage-backed securities offerings” and explaining that “[i]f the allega-
tions of the C
ue, it is a mild and modest cost of doing business”). 
254 See Richman v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 261, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (holding that the plaintiff successfully alleged the defendant’s culpability for mate-
rial misrepresentation because the firm admitted, in an SEC consent judgment, to making 
a “mistake” in its marketing materials); James, supra no
e applied collateral estoppel to issues that were the subject of consent judgments). 
255 See Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 335 (opining that “if [the court’s judgment]does 
not rest on facts—cold, hard, solid facts, established either by admissions or by trials—it 
serves no lawful or moral purpose . . . .”); Johnson, supra note 2, at 657 (arguing that SEC 
settlements create precedent because other actors take cues from them). 
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deter others from imitating the defendant’s dubious behavior.256 It 
would also provide the public with definitive information about a new 
form of deviancy.257 Finally, an admission in a high-profile case would 
advance the public interest by deterring misconduct and putting other 
parties on notice that such wrongdoing will not go unpunished.258 
 Alternatively, in large, novel, and high-profile cases, the SEC could 
enforcement action 
 un
and conclusively establish the defendant’s guilt—or lack thereof.263 
Moreover, trial testimony might identify additional details about the 
     
simply omit “no-admit” clauses from its consent judgment proposals.259 
The omission of “no-admit” clauses would deter wrongdoing by remov-
ing a settlement term that defendants desire.260 The absence of such 
clauses would ensure that subsequent complainants could attempt to 
base their claims on the SEC’s allegations, and could rely on the terms 
of the consent judgment for its preclusive effect.261 
 If a defendant in a large, novel, or high-profile 
is willing to admit to misbehavior or omit a “no-admit” clause, the 
SEC should take the case to trial.262 Trial, like an admission, can clearly 
                                                                                                                 
256 See Johnson, supra note 2, at 657 (contending that SEC settlements influence third 
parties’ behavior, but arguing that the SEC should still allow the judiciary to create prece-
dent by taking cases trial). 
257 See Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 335. In Citigroup I, Judge Rakoff expounded: 
 Finally, in any case like this that touches on the transparency of financial 
arkets whosm e gyrations have so depressed our economy and debilitated our 
lives, there is an overriding public interest in knowing the truth. In much of 
the world, propaganda reigns, and truth is confined to secretive, fearful whis-
pers. Even in our nation, apologists for suppressing or obscuring the truth 
may always be found. But the S.E.C., of all agencies, has a duty, inherent in its 
statutory mission, to see that the truth emerges . . . . 
 See generally id. (declaring repeatedly that the SEC should consider the public 
pecially in important cases that “touch[] on the tran
Id. 
258 inter-
est, es sparency of the financial mar-
 whose gyrations have so debilitated our lives”). 
it” consent judgments and observing 
that
 Robert Khuzami, Director of the Division of En-
forc
335 (preferring that admissions or trials prove the truth or falsity of the 
SEC
kets
259 See id. at 332 (criticizing the SEC’s use of “neither admit nor deny” clauses as “hal-
lowed by history, but not by reason”). 
260 See id. (disparaging the SEC’s use of “no-adm
 mere allegations cannot serve as the basis for collateral estoppel); see also Settlement 
Practices, supra note 7, at 6 (statement of
ement, Securities and Exchange Commission) (supporting the use of “no-admit” con-
sent judgments by insisting that defendants would refuse to settle in the absence of “no-
admit” clauses). 
261 See Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 333 (criticizing a “no-admit” consent judgment 
because it could not be used for collateral estoppel purposes). 
262 See id. at 
’s allegations). 
263 See id. 
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defendant’s conduct.264 And, in any event, the judicial system would 
gain an opportunity to build on its own precedent and develop the par-
ticular field of law at issue.265 Players in the securities market, including 
the SEC, would receive more insight on full-scale litigation, and they 
could shape their behavior accordingly.266 
 In small, ordinary, and low-profile cases, though, eradicating “no-
admit” clauses may not serve the public interest strongly enough to 
jeopardize the possibility of settlement.267 In such cases, the public’s 
te
ics as 
ll
                                                                                                                     
in rest in speedy dispute resolution may outweigh its interest in clearly 
and conclusively establishing wrongdoing.268 The harm caused by the 
defendants may not be so widespread, so unprecedented, or so gener-
ally compelling to justify the costs of fully litigating these cases.269 
 Nevertheless, requiring admissions or removing “no-admit” 
clauses from SEC consent judgment proposals in large, novel, and 
high-profile cases should, in fact, satisfy judiciary-oriented crit
we  as like-minded executive-oriented observers.270 It would, as ex-
plained, satisfy the public interest by deterring future misconduct and 
establishing past misconduct when those objectives are paramount.271 
The solution simply carries more force when advanced from an ex-
 
didn’t have those days and days and days of testimony about what those 
financial institutions had been up to”). 
e Commission) (noting that “set-
tlem armed investors with increased speed and certainty [but] requir-
ing 
o advance the public interest), with Settlement 
Prac  note 7, at 3, 7 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director of the Division of 
Enf
p. 2d at 332 (expressing 
disa
264 See Grim, supra note 25 (stating that “every time there’s a settlement, and not a tri-
al, it means that we 
265 See Johnson, supra note 2, at 657, 679 (maintaining that the SEC should settle fewer 
cases to allow the judiciary to develop legal precedent). 
266 See id. at 657, 679. 
267 See Settlement Practices, supra note 7, at 3, 7 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director 
of the Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchang
ents return funds to h
admissions as a condition of settlement would likely result in longer delays before vic-
tims are compensated . . . and the expenditure of significant SEC resources that could 
instead be spent stopping the next fraud”). 
268 See id. 
269 Compare Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 335 (denigrating the SEC’s “no-admit” con-
sent judgment proposals because they fail t
tices, supra
orcement, Securities and Exchange Commission) (defending the SEC’s “no-admit” 
consent judgment proposals on grounds of cost and uncertainty). 
270 See FTC v. Circa Direct LLC (Circa Direct III ), No. 11-2172, 2012 WL 3987610, at *1 
(D.N.J. Feb. 22, 2012) (concerned that an FTC “no-admit” consent judgment would not 
establish the truth of the FTC’s allegations); Citigroup I, 827 F. Sup
pproval of the SEC’s policy to settle enforcement actions on a “no-admit” basis); Letter 
from Judge Randa, supra note 12, at 1 (citing Citigroup I in his request for further informa-
tion regarding a proposed consent judgment). 
271 See Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332–33; Settlement Practices, supra note 7, at 6 
(statement of Robert Khuzami, Director of the Division of Enforcement, Securities and 
Exchange Commission). 
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ecutive-centric perspective.272 The SEC has the requisite information 
to determine whether a case is large, novel, or high-profile enough to 
necessitate the removal of a “no-admit” clause, and it can proactively 
craft the consent judgment proposals that will be considered by the 
court.273 
2. Limiting the Scope of a “No-Admit” Clause Within a 
Particular Action 
-admit” consent 
jud en in less weighty enforcement actions.274 When 
rta
                                                                                                                     
 The SEC should change the way it approaches “no
gment proposals ev
ce in aspects of a case prove more important than others, the SEC 
should limit the reach of any “no-admit” clause by expressly restricting 
its scope to a subset of allegations.275 For example, when an otherwise 
ordinary enforcement action involves a novel but subsidiary issue, the 
SEC should exclude the issue from the reach of any “no-admit” 
clause.276 Similarly, when the defendant fears criminal prosecution, the 
SEC should specify that a “no-admit” clause will prevent collateral es-
toppel only in criminal cases.277 Particularized “no-admit” clauses, then, 
could give the parties more flexibility in reaching a compromise that 
best serves the public interest.278 
 
272 See Settlement Practices, supra note 7, at 2 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director of 
the 
ces, supra note 7, at 2 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director of 
the 
the scope of its “no-
adm
llegations to which the 
SEC
of the Division of Enforcement, Securities and Ex-
cha
ceedings). Defendants would 
still 
Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission); SEC Enforcement 
Manual, supra note 16, § 2.4; Coffee & Sale, supra note 30, at 55. 
273 See Settlement Practi
Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission); SEC Enforcement 
Manual, supra note 16, § 2.4; Coffee & Sale, supra note 30, at 55. 
274 See ABA Report, supra note 7, at 1169 (advising the SEC to limit 
it” clauses); James, supra note 21, at 193 (maintaining that the parties to a consent 
judgment should specify the collateral effects they intend it to entail). 
275 See ABA Report, supra note 7, at 1169 (contending that the a
’s “neither admit nor deny” clauses apply should be limited); James, supra note 21, at 
193 (remarking that the parties to a consent judgment can specify the collateral effects 
they intend the judgment to entail). 
276 See ABA Report, supra note 7, at 1169; see also Johnson, supra note 2, at 679 (recom-
mending that the SEC exempt novel cases from settlement). 
277 See James, supra note 21, at 193; see also Settlement Practices, supra note 7, at 6 (state-
ment of Robert Khuzami, Director 
nge Commission) (claiming that defendants are especially fearful of agreeing to a con-
sent judgment that will be used against them in criminal pro
face collateral estoppel effects in civil cases. See James, supra note 21, at 193. 
278 ABA Report, supra note 7, at 1169 (noting that, by restricting a “neither admit nor 
deny” clause to certain allegations, the SEC could serve both its own legitimate interests 
and the legitimate interests of the defendant while enhancing perceived fairness to third 
parties). 
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 Even critics who have assumed a judiciary-centric position should 
agree that limiting the scope of the SEC’s “no-admit” clauses is, at the 
ry
Judgment’s Provisions 
 should be required 
to anations for their agreements.281 Such expla-
atio
likely to enter consent judgments when they are accompanied by com-
     
ve  least, a step in the right direction.279 Moreover, the SEC is the ac-
tor in the best position to determine when and how to narrow the 
scope of “no-admit” clauses and put a plan to do so into action.280 
3. Requiring Explanations for a Proposed Consent 
 In all proposed consent judgments, the parties
provide thorough expl
n ns would enhance transparency, diminish appearances of impro-
priety, and give the courts more information by which to make educated 
approval decisions.282 Comprehensive explanations would enhance 
transparency by providing the public with detailed information about 
the SEC’s allegations and the reasons for settlement.283 As Judge Rakoff 
has observed, the public has a strong interest in financial transparency 
following the 2008 financial crisis.284 Furthermore, because administra-
tive inertia, bias, or an agency’s desire for a “quick headline” might con-
flict with the public interest, detailed explanations would diminish ap-
pearances of impropriety.285 If the SEC has good reasons to settle, 
providing an explanation for its settlement could quell any fears that the 
SEC was influenced by improper motives.286 Finally, courts are more 
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plete explanations.287 If the SEC can better explain the basis for its con-
sent judgment proposals, it will be able to avoid the delays and litigation 
expenses that attend court scrutiny and possible rejection.288 
 Indeed, thorough explanations for consent judgment proposals 
should delight judiciary-oriented critics.289 Detailed, reasoned exposi-
tions would expand the information available to all interested actors, 
-
g, 
                                                                                                                     
including both the public and the courts.290 The public would learn 
more about the defendant’s misconduct and the SEC’s decision-making 
process.291 And although courts might never gain access to the SEC’s 
full wealth of knowledge or develop the ability to craft entire consent 
judgments on their own, the SEC serves few legitimate interests by re-
taining information that could have been shared with the judiciary.292 
 In sum, the SEC should make a number of adjustments to its cur-
rent settlement practices.293 In large, novel, and high-profile enforce-
ment actions, the SEC should require defendants to admit to wrongdo
in or else it should simply refuse to settle on a “no-admit” basis.294 In 
other cases, the SEC should limit the allegations to which its “no-admit” 
clauses apply, and it should specify the collateral estoppel effects its “no-
admit” clauses are intended to prevent.295 In all cases, the SEC should 
provide complete explanations for its decision to submit a “no-admit” 
or “admit” consent judgment proposal.296 These changes would address 
judiciary-centric as well as executive-centric concerns while avoiding 
inexact or ineffective scrutiny.297 
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ndant refuses to confess to the SEC’s 
allegations. In the wake of th  crisis, courts have become 
increasingly critical of the SE -admit” clauses. These claus-
s, t
Conclusion 
 The vast majority of SEC consent judgments contain a “no-admit” 
clause, pursuant to which a defe
e 2008 financial
C’s use of “no
e hey assert, provide inadequate deterrent value and insufficiently 
inform the public about the truth of the SEC’s claims. The SEC, how-
ever, occupies a much more advantageous position than a court to 
weigh the costs, benefits, and risks of a litigation decision and imple-
ment a plan of action. The executive-centric perspective, therefore, 
provides a better vantage point from which to evaluate SEC “no-admit” 
proposals than does the judiciary-centric perspective. A view through 
the executive-centric perspective reveals that the SEC overuses “no-
admit” consent judgment proposals, applies “no-admit” clauses too 
broadly, and may provide scanty support for its settlement proposals. In 
large, novel, and high-profile cases, the SEC should eliminate “no-
admit” clauses from its consent judgment proposals; in other cases, it 
should narrow the scope of its “no-admit” clauses; and in all cases, the 
SEC should fully justify its particular settlement proposals. In adopting 
these recommendations, the SEC would promote the public interest by 
deterring future violations of the securities laws and providing the pub-
lic with information about past violations. Executive-centric critics and 
judiciary-centric critics alike should applaud such measures, which 
would ensure that the SEC fulfills its obligations to the public and holds 
wrongdoers accountable. 
Lynndon Groff 
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